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RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES: A MODEL FOR
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER
THEIR NATURAL RESOURCES
by Melissa A. Jamisont
I. INTRODUCTION
After enduring centuries of a unique form of colonization, the 300-500
million indigenous peoples of the world continue to live as marginalized
peoples.1  One of the most significant and enduring aspects of their
marginalization is the deprivation of indigenous control over their land and
natural resources. This disruption adversely affects a fundamental element of
their identity:
[T]he close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and
understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their
integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous communities, relations
to the land are not merely a matter of possession and production but a material
and spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their
• 2
cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations.
t L.L.M. in International Legal Studies, American University, Washington College of Law; J.D.,
with honors, The Ohio State University, Michael E. Moritz College of Law; currently practicing in
Washington, D.C. The author would like to thank Professor Rick Wilson of American University,
Washington College of Law, for his feedback and encouragement throughout the process of
preparing this article.
t. JASMINE BRUCE, INDIGENOUS YOUTH, 83-84 (2003), available at
http://www.iyp.oxfam.org/campaign/documents/youth COMMIsION-reprt/ndigenous-Youth.pdf
(last visited Mar. 22, 2005) (showing that indigenous people are approximately 5% of the total
global population).
2. The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of Aug.
31, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, 149 (2001), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf/seriec_79_.esp.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
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Maintaining this integral relationship with their land requires several
components, including the right of indigenous peoples to control their natural
resources. Despite its importance to their cultures, indigenous efforts to control
their land and natural resources often face a significant obstacle: the principle of
state sovereignty.3  Admittedly, this principle is important for states, and
circumstances often justify assertion of sovereignty rights. For instance,
governments may need to assert their sovereignty to prevent other states from
invading their territory. Similarly, the exercise of their sovereign power enables
states to protect their citizens against threats such as exploitation by foreign
investors.
Unfortunately, states have not limited their reliance on sovereignty to
protection against such outside threats. Instead, they have extended the principle
to justify their suppression of internal dissension, including that arising out of the
paramount interests of indigenous peoples. Under claims of sovereignty, states
assert an exclusive right to control the natural resources within their boundaries,
without regard for indigenous interests. 5 In fact, states often consider indigenous
land claims to be a serious threat against their sovereignty and respond to them
with measures having disastrous results.
International law has responded to this over-reliance on state sovereignty by
increasingly limiting the scope of the principle. By imposing obligations such as
human rights norms on states, international law is moving toward a better
balance between state sovereignty and other interests internal to the state.
6
However, these changes have been gradual, and indigenous peoples remain in a
position of alienation and denial of their right to control their land and natural
resources. This article proposes a unique solution: applying the system of rural
electric cooperatives (RECs) in the United States as a model for protecting the
rights of indigenous peoples, especially their right to control their natural
resources.
To understand how this model could apply, parts II and III provide an
overview of indigenous peoples. Part I1 discusses the history of indigenous
peoples and the importance of their relationship with their land and natural
resources. Part III explores the basis under international law for asserting the
right of indigenous peoples to control their natural resources, a right known as
3. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 19 (rev. ed. 1996).
4. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land: Final Working
Paper Prepared by the Special Rapporteur, U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, 53d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 5, at T 67, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Final Working Paper]; see also NICO SCRRUVER,
SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DuTiEs 22-23 (1997).
5. SCHRIJVER, supra note 4, at 22-23.
6. HANNUM, supra note 3, at 19-20.
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permanent sovereignty. Setting up the model of rural electric cooperatives, part
IV describes the history and development of the cooperatives in the United
States. Finally, part V proposes a transfer of the REC model to ensure the
indigenous right of permanent sovereignty.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND
THEIR LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Developing a system for ensuring the rights of indigenous peoples first
requires an understanding of the fundamental connection between the peoples
and their land and natural resources. This provides the context for considering
and properly applying any model for protecting indigenous rights. To that end,
this section considers the essential relationship between indigenous peoples and
their lands and natural resources, both through a brief description of indigenous
peoples and by discussing two countries as examples. A discussion of the
broader history of indigenous peoples further establishes the ongoing
interference in their integral relationship with their land and natural resources.
A. Defining Indigenous Peoples
As a preliminary matter, establishing an understanding about which groups
qualify as indigenous peoples is important. International law has yet to adopt a
universally accepted definition. In fact, indigenous peoples often object to any
such efforts out of their desire to retain the important right of self-definition.
7
While respecting that right, a definition will be helpful in this article to the extent
that it shows some of the unique aspects shared by indigenous peoples.
Accordingly, this article refers to indigenous peoples as including those peoples
who:
[O]n account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the
country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of
conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present State boundaries and
who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions.
8
7. See, e.g., Working Paper by the Chairperson-Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, on the
Concept of "Indigenous People," Sub Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities, 14th Sess., at [ 9, 35-36, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2 (1996) [hereinafter
1996 Working Paper]; see also HANNUM, supra note 3, at 88-91; Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and
Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV.
HUM. RTs. J. 57, 110-15 (1999).
8. International Labour Organization [ILO] Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382, art. l(l)(b), (entered into
force Sep. 5, 1991 ) [hereinafter ILO Conv. 169].
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B. The Deprivation of their Land and Resources: Two Country Examples
As this definition suggests, indigenous peoples around the world have faced
similar experiences of colonization. However, all indigenous peoples have
unique circumstances. The following discussion, which considers indigenous
peoples in Nigeria and Canada, demonstrates the diversity of indigenous
peoples, both in their history and in their current relationships with their
respective governments. The uniqueness of each indigenous peoples is
important for considering how to apply the proposed cooperative model, as
certain aspects of a particular people may either limit or prevent its application.
1. Nigeria
The most populous nation in Africa is Nigeria, with approximately 120
million people. Perhaps because of this large size, Nigeria has an extremely
diverse culture representing most native races of Africa. Between 250 and 400
ethnic groups descend from these native races, bringing a variety of cultures and
political structures to modem Nigeria.' 0 As with many other countries in Africa,
the modem state of Nigeria is largely a result of European colonialism. That
colonial history created the circumstances resulting in the mistreatment of certain
indigenous peoples, such as the Ogoni, which continues to present day.
a. History of Nigeria and Its Peoples
The earliest native occupants to settle into the Niger Delta region arrived as
early as three thousand years ago. From the very beginning, the region
developed as a multitude of empires divided along ethnic lines.1 2 As a result, the
inhabitants of the region lived separately in their own unique traditions, rather
than through one peoples or culture.' 3 Some ethnic groups did dominate various
regions of the Niger Delta. For example, beginning in the 9th Century and
continuing for more than a millenium, the Eastern region developed complex
• 14
political and social systems under the Kanem-Bomo and Igbo empires. The
9. History and Profile: Nigeria, CONSULATE GENERAL OF NIGERIA: NEW YORK, at
http://www.nigeria-consulate-ny.orgfrhis%20is%2ONigeria-fileslm-history-people.htm (last
visited Mar. 22, 2005)[hereinafter CONSULATE].
10. FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY ch. I
(Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1992), available at http://Acweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html#ngOO50 (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005) [hereinafter NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY]; see also CONSULATE, supra note
9 (noting that despite this large diversity, most of the ethnic groups are small, and four ethnic
groups constitute sixty percent of the population).
11. CONSULATE, supra note 9, at 1; see also NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 10, ch. 1.
12. CONSULATE, supra note 9.
13. See NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 10, ch. 1.
14. See CONSULATE, supra note 9; see also NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 10, ch. 1;
Federal Republic of Nigeria, CARTAGE.ORG, at
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Western region flourished during a similar period under the Hausa-Fulani and
the Yoruba empires. 15  Though these empires dominated in their particular
regions, other regions supported numerous cultures without centralized
monarchies. 16
The groundwork for changing this multitude of empires began with the first
European contact, when the Portuguese came to trade with and to proselytize the
native inhabitants. 17 By the 16th Century, Africa attracted additional European
powers, including the Netherlands, France, and Great Britain.18 All came to
serve one primary interest: the slave trade. 19 Great Britain soon joined Portugal
as the dominant Europeans in the Niger delta.
20
Two events during the 19th Century brought Great Britain into more
significant involvement in the region. First, an Islamic holy war between the
years of 1804-08 led Great Britain to fight against the Niger Muslims.2 1 Then,
after declaring the slave trade to be illegal in 1807, the British also began to
intervene, in order to bring an end to that practice in the Niger Delta.
22
Eventually, this intervention resulted in a more firm entrenchment of the British
in the region, as shown by their designation of the Lagos Island Colony in
1861.23
British imperialist ambitions soon began to surface, especially after their
European rivals expanded further into Africa. 24 Great Britain began to enter into
treaties with native chiefs. This led to the establishment of the British Oil Rivers
Protectorate in southern Nigeria. 25 The primary purposes for establishing the
Protectorate were to control trade and to protect the Lagos Colony.26 British
domination of the region became complete when Great Britain proclaimed a new
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria in 1900.27
http://www.cartage.org.lb/en/themes/GeogHist/histories/historyfhiscountriesN/nigeria.htn" (last
visited March 3, 2005) [hereinafter CARTAGE].
15. CARTAGE, supra note 14; see also CONSULATE, supra note 9 (noting that the strength of the
Yoruba prevailed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).
16. CONSULATE, supra note 9.
17. NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 10, ch.1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See generally CARTAGE, supra note 14.
21. NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 10, ch.1.
22. Id.
23. CONSULATE, supra note 9.
24. NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 10, ch.1.
25. CARTAGE, supra note 14 (noting that Great Britain renamed it the Niger Coast Protectorate in
1893 and, finally, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1900).
26. See NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 10, ch.1.
27. CARTAGE, supra note 14.
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Initially, the two Protectorates were significant because their creation
established British sovereignty over the territory, vis-A-vis other European
powers. However, their existence also had another effect: they brought all of the
Niger inhabitants under one central government. The centralization process
became complete in 1914, when Great Britain merged the administration of the
two Protectorates into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria.
28
Though Great Britain consolidated its control of the Nigerian peoples, they
continued to exploit regional cultural divisions by grouping the Colony along
regional and ethnic lines. 29 Despite this imperial effort to maintain power by
reinforcing internal divisions among the colonized peoples, the people of Nigeria
finally united to demand self-government and independence from colonial
control. As early as the 1920s, Nigerians put aside their cultural differences to
fight for independence. 3 Their struggle escalated after World War II, resulting
in the initial successes of the Constitution in 1947 and of an evolving
federalization. 3 1 On October 1, 1960, Nigeria gained independence.
32
However, with independence came renewed internal divisiveness.
Numerous ethnic, religious, and political tensions fractured the country.33
Though they successfully formed a Republic in 1963, the internal pressure
continued to increase. In 1967, the divisions escalated and civil war broke out.
34
When the war ended two and a half years later, Nigeria finally appeared to be on
the road toward unification and increasing prosperity.
In the early 1970s, the country began to realize the economic benefits of its
large oil reserves, becoming the world's fifth largest oil producer.35  Some
leaders attempted to translate this economic success into countrywide
development programs, targeting such concerns as agricultural productivity.
36
Such progress promised to unite Nigeria. That promise ended in the early 1980s,
when the decrease in the oil market brought more economic instability and
political unrest.37 Several coups d'etat took place over the next decade and a
half, intermingled with periods of military rule. a8  The increasing structural
division of the state was one sign of cultural tensions: the federal structure,
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 10, ch.1.
31. CARTAGE, supra note 14.
32. NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 10, ch.1.
33. See CARTAGE, supra note 14; see also NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 10, ch. 1.
34. NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 10, at ch. 1.
35. CARTAGE, supra note 14; see also NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 10, ch. 1.
36. CARTAGE, supra note 14.
37. Id.
38. CARTAGE, supra note 14.
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which began with three regional governments, continued to fragment along
racial lines, resulting in a federation with thirty-six states.
39
b. Hostility Toward the Ogoni
Another sign of the decreasing unity was the negative impact of
government policies on particular groups. The plight of one such group, the
Ogoni, gained international attention in 1995. The Ogoni are an indigenous
people of southern Nigeria who have inhabited their territory for approximately
500 years. 40  Their territory, known as Ogoniland, is roughly 100,000 square
kilometers and is the home of approximately 500,000 Ogoni members.
4 1
Ogoniland became a source of special tension in Nigeria because of the oil
in the territory - it was the site of the first oil discovery in Nigeria in 1958.
42
Since then, the Ogoni have suffered significant incursions onto their lands in an
effort by the government and private corporations to profit from the oil reserves.
The Nigerian government has supported oil companies in overrunning the
territory to extract the oil, without any consultation of or approval from the
Ogoni people.
4 3
The impact of this exploitative process44 has been devastating for the Ogoni
and other indigenous peoples in the area. These peoples have faced terrible loss,
beginning with government actions to strip them of their land, without
consultation, compensation, or consent.4 5 The government continued to injure
them by authorizing corporate extraction policies, resulting in significant
pollution of their remaining land. For example, oil spills and gas flares
contaminated the drinking water, fishing grounds, farmlands, and air. Evidence
of this pollution is overwhelming. The CIA estimates that oil spills resulted in
the dumping of two and one-half million barrels of oil into the Niger Delta
between the years of 1986 and 1996 - an amount that is equivalent to one Exxon
39. CONSULATE, supra note 9.
40. Ogoni, UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES ORGANISATION, at
http://www.unpo.org/member.php?arg=43 (last visited Mar. 22, 2004) [hereinafter UNPO].
41. LEGBORSI SARO PYAGBARA, THE OGONI OF NIGERIA: OIL AND EXPLOITATION, available at
http://www.minorityrights.org/admin/Download/pdf/NigeriaMicro.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2005);
see also Paul Lewis, Blood and Oil: A Special Report: After Nigeria Represses, Shell Defends Its
Record, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1996, at Al.
42. The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social
Rights v. Nigeria 30, 49, ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 (March 14, 1996) [hereinafter SERAC
Communication] (noting that the government of Nigeria did not contest the facts as presented in
the Communication).
43. Id. 4.
44. This article uses forms of "exploitation" to refer to the development of natural resources.
However, the word can also mean abuse or unfair treatment. Though both may accurately describe
the situation faced by indigenous peoples, this article intends the application of the first meaning.
45. PYAGBARA, supra note 41.
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Valdez disaster per year during that ten-year period.4 6 By their own admission,
oil companies spilled at least 100,000 barrels in 1997 and 1998 alone. Gas
flares, which have burned off eight million cubic feet of natural gas, further
contribute to the environmental pollution and to global warming.
These government and corporate policies have devastated the Ogoni and
their land. The most obvious harm is the destruction of the land itself. The
Ogoni rely on their land to provide for their physical needs, but they also look to
it as the source of their culture: their connection with the land is so close that the
Ogoni worship the land as a god.47 Beyond the harm to their physical and
cultural reliance on the land are additional harms to the Ogoni people.
According to the CIA study, the continuing pollution of their land has resulted in
increasing poverty and declining quality of life for the Niger inhabitants.48 More
specifically, the Ogoni suffer from insufficiencies in infrastructure, healthcare,
and education.
49
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of the actions of the government and
extractive corporations is that they have not returned any of the monies to the
Ogoni, even though they are making immense profits.50  For example, one
company, Shell Nigeria, has extracted oil worth more than $30 billion from
Ogoniland since 1958.51 As a result, local indigenous peoples are unable to
invest any of the profits into their local communities, even to compensate for the
harm of the extraction process to those communities. 52 In addition, the Ogoni
suffer the depreciation of the value of their land, as their resources are exported
without any return of the profits to the community. Combined with the original
deprivation of land, this extraction of their natural resources leaves the Ogoni
economically incapable of building an infrastructure to provide for, among other
things, healthcare and education for their children.
In response to these continuing threats to their society, the Ogoni formed a
resistance, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP).53 At
the same time, however, the government was forcefully suppressing all political
opposition.54  Despite this policy, MOSOP tried to negotiate a common
46. Douglas Farah, Nigeria's Oil Exploitation Leaves Delta Poisoned, Poor, WASH. POST, Mar.
18, 2001, at A22.
47. PYAGBARA, supra note 41.
48. Farah, supra note 46.
49. PYAGBARA, supra note 41.
50. Mas Achmad Santosa, The Right to a Healthy Environment, in CIRCLE OF RIGHTS:
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL RIGHTS ACTIVISM: A TRAINING MANUAL 286, 293 (2000); see
also PYAGBARA, supra note 41, at 3; Farah, supra note 46.
51. Santosa, supra note 50, at 293.
52. PYAGBARA, supra note 41.
53. UNPO, supra note 40.
54. CARTAGE, supra note 14.
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resolution with the government. The government responded severely, sending
security forces to attack Ogoni villages, burning and destroying homes and
killing some villagers. 56  In the 1990s, after their diplomatic efforts failed,
MOSOP began to retaliate by sabotaging the oilfields.57  Government abuse
further escalated, coming to a head in 1995 when military "security" forces
physically subdued MOSOP and executed nine of their leaders for the oilfield
attacks.
58
Following the executions, international outrage spurred the Nigerian
government to reform their policies toward the Ogoni resistance. Though their
official policy toward the Ogoni has since changed, the government forces have
not altered their practices. The African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights found that abuse continues to be a reality. 59  According to the
Commission, these abuses include continued exploitation by the Nigerian
government and its corporate partners of the oil resources of Ogoniland, in
violation of the right of the Ogoni to "freely dispose of their wealth and natural
resources."
60
2. Canada: An Evolving Relationship with Its Indigenous Peoples
The indigenous peoples of Canada have a history that in many ways
parallels that of the Ogoni of Nigeria. One similarity is that upon arrival,
European settlers began exploiting their territory. However, an important
difference is that Canada did not endure anything similar to the recent
decolonization that Nigeria experienced in the 1960s. Perhaps more important
than these historical comparisons is the current status of indigenous peoples in
Canada.
a. History of Indigenous Peoples in Canada
61
The first contact between European explorers and the indigenous peoples of
Canada occurred as early as the 1400s. 62 The relationship between these groups
55. PYAGBARA, supra note 41.
56. SERAC Communication, supra note 42, IN 7-9; see also PYAGBARA, supra note 41.
57. Lewis, supra note 41.
58. PYAGBARA, supra note 41; see also Lewis, supra note 41.
59. See SERAC Communication, supra note 42 (noting that misconduct has continued, with
criticisms of police misconduct arising through 2004); see, e.g., Ogoni: Shell and Police Instigate
Violence in Ogoni, UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES ORGANISATION, at
http://www.unpo.org/news-detail.php?arg=43&par-1 162 (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
60. SERAC Communication, supra note 42, 1 55 (citing to African (Banjul) Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982),
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), art. 21(1)).
61. In addition to the phrase "indigenous peoples," this article may also incorporate the terms
used in Canada to refer to their indigenous peoples, including Aboriginal peoples and First
Nations.
20051
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
initially remained informal. As more settlers began to arrive in the 18th Century,
Great Britain sought to preempt the competing claims of other European powers
by establishing its own sovereignty in the territory. One method the British
pursued was formalizing its relationship with the indigenous peoples.
63
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 6 established a formal relationship with
the indigenous peoples in the "Indian Provisions," through which Great Britain
claimed sovereignty over the lands of the indigenous peoples. However, the
Proclamation also reserved the lands "for the use of the said Indians," thereby
retaining a right of Aboriginal ownership and authority over the territories.
Only the Crown could attain ownership of the Aboriginal lands and then only
through treaty negotiations.66  Thus, the British government recognized
indigenous ownership of the land and natural resources and only asserted its own
sovereignty vis-A-vis other European powers.
Despite its apparent respect for the indigenous peoples of Canada, a
significant limitation of the Proclamation later became apparent: its provisions
covered only those territories within British control at the time of its issuance,
and the government did not extend its protections as it added new territories. 67
This temporal and geographic limitation of the Proclamation excluded a
significant amount of territory, including the region now known as British
Columbia.
62. See INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS CANADA, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 1, § 5, at 1 (1996), available at http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/cge.htmI (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE ROYAL
COMMISSION]. As stated in the report, the mandate of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples, established on August 26, 1991, was comprehensive:
The Commission of Inquiry should investigate the evolution of the relationship
among aboriginal peoples .... the Canadian government, and Canadian society
as a whole. It should propose specific solutions, rooted in domestic and
international experience, to the problems which have plagued those
relationships and which confront aboriginal peoples today. The Commission
should examine all issues which it deems to be relevant to any or all of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada.
Id. § 1, at 23.
63. A primary tool in this effort was the ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763, available at
http://www.gov.ns.ca/abor/pubs/1763proc.PDF [hereinafter ROYAL PROCLAMATION]; see also First
Nations Historical Timeline, BRITISH COLUMBIA TEACHERS' FEDERATION, at
http://www.bctf.ca/social/AboriginalEd/timeline.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter
Historical Timeline].
64. ROYAL PROCLAMATION, supra note 63.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see also Historical Timeline, supra note 63.
67. The Proclamation applied to the territories of Quebec, East Florida, West Florida, and
Grenada. ROYAL PROCLAMATION, supra note 63; see also Calder v. British Columbia, [ 1973]
S.C.R. 313, 323, 325.
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The territory of British Columbia did not experience migration until late in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Even at that point, European settlers had
little effect on the 40,000-50,000 indigenous peoples in the territory. 68 Though
Great Britain did establish its sovereignty by formally settling the colony of
Vancouver Island in 1849, the number of settlers in the region remained
insignificant. That changed with the gold rush of the 1850s, during which more
than 30,000 Europeans settled into the territory. With such a growing presence
of its subjects in the region, Great Britain established the colony of British
Columbia in 1858.69
The increasing British presence in the region soon began to affect the
indigenous peoples. Since the geographic and temporal limitations of the Royal
Proclamation did not extend to the indigenous peoples in the new colony, the
relationship between the British and the indigenous peoples was informal.
Initially, the colony adopted an official policy that was similar to the protections
of the Proclamation, recognizing Aboriginal title and undertaking to enter into
treaties with the indigenous peoples.7 0 This official policy never developed into
reality, for the colonial government was unable to pay the compensation that
treaties usually required. Growing impatient with the government inaction, the
settlers ignored the rights of the indigenous peoples and began to settle the
indigenous land. 71
The relationship between the government and the indigenous peoples
worsened in 1871, when British Columbia joined the newly created
confederation of Canada.72 At that time, the federal government assumed
responsibility for the indigenous peoples, but the provincial government of
British Columbia retained control of all land and resources within its territory,
including those of the indigenous peoples. 73  By separating the legal
responsibility for the indigenous peoples from the legal right to the land and
resources, British Columbia could decide land issues without regard for its
indigenous inhabitants. This reality soon surfaced when the provincial leaders
deviated from previous practice, and officially denied indigenous rights to the
land or resources. 74 With this denial of legal rights to the land, British Columbia
68. Canadian Confederation: Provinces and Territories: British Columbia, LIBRARY AND
ARCHIVES CANADA, at http://www.collectionscanada.ca/confederation/h 18-2185-e.html (last
visited Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter British Columbia].
69. id.
70. MARY C. HURLEY, THE NISGA'A FINAL AGREEMENT 2 (Library of Parliament, Pub. No. PRB
99-2E) (2002); see also ROYAL PROCLAMATION, supra note 63.
71. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 62, § 6, at 10-11.
72. British Columbia, supra note 68 (noting that the British North America Act provided the
terms for the creation of Canada four years earlier, in 1867).
73. HURLEY, supra note 70, at 3.
74. id. at 2-3.
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faced no legal impediment when it began removing the indigenous peoples to
small reserves.
The federal Canadian Government offered no protection against such
provincial policies. Instead, the central government joined the provinces by
engaging in their own discriminatory practices. For example, the governments
justified the establishment of the McKenna-McBride Commission (the
Commission) as a method for resolving differences between the indigenous
peoples and the provincial governments. In reality, the Commission acted only
to negotiate the size of the reserves to which the government removed the
indigenous peoples. 76 By participating in the activities of the Commission, the
federal government contributed to the efforts by the provincial governments to
strip the indigenous peoples of their native lands and natural resources.
The federal government also undertook its own autonomous efforts to
undermine the culture of the indigenous peoples, especially through the
provisions of its Indian Acts (the Acts).77 Canada promulgated the Acts to use
as the legal tool in its effort to "civilize" its indigenous peoples. 78 Accordingly,
the Acts included several policies aimed at assimilation. For example, the Indian
Acts disenfranchised all indigenous peoples, except those who submitted to
"voluntary enfranchisement" by disavowing their native heritage. 79 By doing so,
persons qualified for full legal protection because the law no longer considered
them indigenous. The Indian Acts further attacked the indigenous peoples of
Canada by formally adopting the practice of removing them from their lands and
placing them on reserves, despite preexisting treaties to the contrary.80
Challenges to such removal were illegal under the Acts, which prohibited
organization and fundraising related to indigenous land claims.8' A third way in
which the Indian Acts worked to assimilate the indigenous peoples was by
criminalizing their participation in significant cultural traditions, including the
potlatch, traditional attire, and dances.
75. Id. at 3.
76. Id.
77. See REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 62, § 6, at 48-52.
78. Id. § 6, at 50.
79. Id. § 6, at 11.
80. Id. § 6, at 46.
81. Fact Sheet: The Nisgp 'a Treaty, INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS CANADA, at
http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/info/nit-e.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Treaty Fact
Sheet].
82. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 62, § 6, at 53. The potlatch is "a ceremonial
feast ... at which the host distributed his possessions as gifts to his guests." The feasts included
several days of singing, dancing, praying, and other ceremonies. Links: Potlatch, NATIVE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF GERMANY E.V. (NAAoG), at
http://www.naaog.de/englisch/glossary.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2005).
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Canada adopted an even harsher policy through collaboration with religious
educational institutions. The goal of this joint venture was to raise a new
generation untainted by the indigenous culture. To that end, the government sent
indigenous children to boarding schools, which forbade any semblance of their
indigenous culture and trained them according to the European lifestyle. The
government justified the practice by calling indigenous families a "deleterious"
atmosphere from which they had to remove the children to improve their views
and habits.
83
Despite such justifications, the schools provided little advantage for the
children. Rather, they had to attend school in poorly designed buildings, suffer
through unsanitary conditions, and endure physical and other abuses. In
addition, the children received a grossly insufficient education, especially when
compared to schools for non-Aboriginal children. However, these abuses could
not compare to the trauma of being removed from their families and denied
"their identity through attacks on their language and spiritual beliefs." 84 The
government was bold in its efforts, blatantly declaring its assimilationist purpose
of "tak[ing] over the parenting of Aboriginal children so that they 'could take
their place anywhere among the people of Canada.' 85 Had they been successful,
the policies and practices under the Indian Acts would have effectively removed
all aspects of indigenous culture from-the land and from the people of Canada.
b. A Process of Restoring Indigenous Rights: Negotiations Based on
the Right of Aboriginal Title
Canada has made continual efforts in recent decades to overcome and
compensate for its inexcusable history. One primary method in its pursuit of
reconciliation is the negotiation of modem-day treaties. The Nisga'a, an
indigenous people of the Nass River Valley in British Columbia, provide a
successful example of the outcome of this process.
i. The Nisga'a
The Nisga'a, with approximately 5,500 members today, are indigenous to
Northwestern British Columbia. 86 Though they share the history of injustice at
the hands of the Canadian and British Columbian governments, their century-
long struggle to realize their rights also sets them apart from many other
indigenous peoples. 87 The recent success of their efforts provides a striking
contrast to the situation of the Ogoni in Nigeria. Despite that success, however,
83. REPORT OFTHE ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 62, § 6, at 57.
84. Id. § 6, at58.
85. Id. § 6, at 57.
86. Treaty Fact Sheet, supra note 81.
87. HURLEY, supra note 70, at 1.
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the Nisga'a story also shows the enduring threat to the rights of indigenous
peoples regarding their land and natural resources.
a. Nisga 'a History
When Europeans first settled into Nisga'a territory in the 1860s, 88 they
immediately recognized the Nisga'a culture as both advanced and distinctive.
Observers noted the unique aspects of the Nisga'a society, including their
organization along kinship lines into four clans - the Killer Whale, Raven, Wolf,
and Eagle.89 The settlers also considered the Nisga'a code of laws, known as
Ayuukhl Nisga'a, to be very noteworthy. The Ayuukhl Nisga'a was remarkable
because of its complexity and breadth, which covered matters as diverse as
education, marriage and divorce, ownership and succession of land, trade,
restitution, membership in the Nisga'a tribe, appointment of chieftains and the
matriarch, and war and peace.90
The initial admiration of these aspects of Nisga'a culture did not instill
respect for their rights, and settlers invaded their territory in vast numbers. The
Nisga'a acted quickly, sendin& their first representatives in protest to the
provincial government in 1881. When British.Columbia failed to respond to
that effort, or a subsequent effort in 1885, the Nisga'a turned to other methods of
asserting their claim.9 2 As with the efforts of MOSOP on behalf of the Ogoni,
the Nisga'a tactics were more forceful, and perhaps even hostile. For example,
in 1886 they forcefully refused access within their territory to the provincial
survey crews. However, they also continued the diplomatic path by organizing
their own land claims process. Through this process, they again attempted to
negotiate issues of land and self-government in 1887. After pursuing a public
inquiry on these issues in 1887-88, both the provincial and the federal
governments dismissed the Nisga'a claim.
93
In fact, government oppression began to escalate as the central and
provincial governments both grew more determined to complete a reserve land
system for all indigenous peoples.9 4 Though necessary for several tribes whose
88. Id. at 3 (noting that the first settlers were missionaries, but fishers, farmers, and loggers soon
followed).
89. Treaty Fact Sheet, supra note 81.
90. Lisa Dufraimont, Continuity and Modification of Aboriginal Rights in the Nisga 'a Treaty, 35
U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 455, 466 (2002) (referring to one description of the Ayuukhl Nisga 'a as
"an ancient code of laws that will stand comparison to any modem constitution or declaration of
statehood and nationality").
91. HURLEY, supra note 70, at 3.
92. Id. at 3-4.
93. Id.
94. Douglas Sanders, "We Intend to Live Here Forever": A Primer on the Nisgoa 'a Treaty, 33 U.
BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 103, 106 (1999).
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lands had not been reserved, including the Nisga'a, the process was faulty
because the government finalized the reserves without consulting the indigenous
peoples. 95 In order to influence the decision regarding their land, the Nisga'a
formed a political organization in 1907.96 This Land Committee acted hastily,
petitioning the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council in 1913.9 7 The
Nisga'a asserted rights under the Royal Proclamation, including rights to
compensation for surrendered lands and to reservation of other territories for
their traditional use.
98
The government never responded to the Nisga'a Petition.9 9 Instead, the
McKenna-McBride Commission handled the Nisga'a land issue in 1924. The
Commission granted the Nisga'a only seventy-six square kilometers of reserve
land. 10 Though the reserve land was within their original territory, it was a
minuscule portion of the 25,000 square kilometers that originally formed the
Nisga'a homeland.101  After designating this small territory as the Nisga'a
reserve, the Indian Acts foreclosed further consideration of the land issue by
criminalizing land claims-related political activity. 10 2 The government did not
lift this prohibition until 1951. Faced with such drastic government opposition
to their efforts, the Nisga'a claim lay dormant for twenty-five years.
b. Gaining Legal Victory: From the Promise of Calder v.
British Columbia 0 3 to the Nisga 'a Final Agreement
The Nisga'a revived their land claim in 1949. At that time, Frank Calder,
the son of the original founder of the Land Committee, won an election to the
British Columbia legislature. 104  Relying on his position, Calder revived the
discussion of indigenous issues by bringing it before the legislature, and by
renewing the Land Committee and the Nisga'a Tribal Council. He also sued the
government of British Columbia, on behalf of the Nisga'a, for violation of their
95. HURLEY, supra note 70, at 4.
96. Id.; see also id. at 11 (noting that other sources indicate the Committee may have been
formed as early as 1890); Treaty Fact Sheet, supra note 81.
97. Petition to His Majesty's Privy Council, In the Matter of the Territory of the Nisgg 'a Nation
or Tribe of Indians, GOV'T OF CAN., May 21, 1913, available at
http://www.schoolnet.ca/aboriginal/nisgal/petit-e.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2005) [hereinafter
Nisga'a Petition]; see also HURLEY, supra note 70, at 4.
98. HURLEY, supra note 70, at 4.
99. Sanders, supra note 94, at 106.
100. HURLEY, supra note 70, at 5.
101. Irwin Warns of Problems if Nisga'a Deal Falls Through, CAN. PRESS NEWSWIRE, Jan. 28,
1996 (on file with author) [hereinafter Irwin Warns of Problems].
102. HURLEY, supra note 70, at 5.
103. [1973] S.C.R. 313.
104. HURLEY, supra note 70, at 5.
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right of Aboriginal title, 105 This latter effort resulted in the first major victory
for Nisga'a land claims: Calder v. British Columbia. Eventually, Calder would
prove to be a milestone for all indigenous peoples in Canada.
The Nisga'a limited their claim of Aboriginal title to 1,000 square miles of
the original Nisga'a territory.' °6 They asserted a right to this territory on the
grounds that the Nisga'a never agreed to forfeit the land through a treaty or any
other means. Having never willingly relinquished their lands, the Nisga'a
maintained that their title arising out of aboriginal occupation continues today.
10 7
After dismissal by the trial court, the Nisga'a appealed the case through the
courts of British Columbia and to the Supreme Court of Canada.108  The
Supreme Court considered two questions in the appeal: whether the Nisga'a
originally possessed Aboriginal title over the land at issue and whether the
government ever extinguished that title. As to the first matter, the Court
affirmatively recognized the original right of Aboriginal title, which derives
from the historic presence of indigenous peoples on their homelands. 10 9 In
recognizing the right of Aboriginal title for the first time, the Court articulated
that the basis of the right is:
[T]he fact.., that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in
societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries
.... What they are asserting in this action is that they had a right to continue
to live on their lands as their forefathers had lived and that this right has never
been lawfully extinguished.
110
Furthermore, the Court found that the Nisga'a qualified as owners of Aboriginal
title because "their ancestors occupied [the lands at issue] since time
immemorial.",I
1
The Court then held that modern land claims could not be based on
Aboriginal title alone, but must also prove that the government never exercised
its counter right of extinguishment. Any government exercise of that right -
whether by treaty, war of conquest, purchase, or adverse possession - would
have ended the rights associated with Aboriginal title. 113 The Court concluded
that British Columbia extinguished the Nisga'a claim through an act of adverse
possession. "[T]he sovereign authority elected to exercise complete dominion




109. Id. 1 26, 390, 393; see also Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 335.
110. Calder, [19731 S.C.R. 26.
111. Id. 79.
112. Id. 146.
113. Id. (relying on Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877)).
[Vol. 12:2
RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
over the lands in question .. . when, by legislation, it opened up such lands for• ,1 14
settlement, subject to the reserves of land set aside for Indian occupation.
Thus, the government allocation of the Nisga'a reserve limited their land rights
to those particular lands, and the subsequent adverse use of the remaining
territory lawfully extinguished all other Nisga' a rights."
5
On its face, the Calder holding appears to be a loss for the Nisga'a claim,
but the decision was a victory because it provided for a right of Aboriginal title
upon which other tribes could base their land claims. The Nisga'a thus
considered it their victory, even if it did not result in a positive resolution of their
own claim. The case did trigger a process that would ultimately lead to success
for the Nisga'a: at the conclusion of the case, the governments of Canada andS ,116
British Columbia both agreed to negotiate a resolution with the Nisga a.
To begin the negotiation process in 1991, the three parties - the Nisga'a,
Canada, and British Columbia - entered into a preliminary agreement that
provided a framework for the negotiations. 17 Under this agreement, the parties
clearly identified the ownership and unimpeded control of Nisga'a land and
resources as one of the primary issues of concern for the Nisga'a. 18 At this
initial stage, the parties also provided for interim measures to protect Nisga'a
interests from further detrimental government actions during the negotiations. 119
After more than two decades of negotiating, the Nisga'a were able to claim
a successful end to their struggle when the parties signed the Final Agreement on
April 27, 1999. 12 Of all the provisions, those guaranteeing their ownership and
114. Id.T 74.
115. d. U1 74-76.
116. Treaty Fact Sheet, supra note 81.
117. Nisga 'a Comprehensive Land Claims Agreement, GoV'T OF CAN., May 20, 1991, available
at http:/fwww.schoolnet.calaboriginallnisgal/frame-e.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2005) [hereinafter
1991 Agreement].
118. Nisga 'a Land Claims, Gov'T OF CAN., available at
http://www.schoolnet.ca/aboriginallnisgal/claims-e.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2005) [hereinafter
Nisga'a Land Claims]; see also 1991 Agreement, supra note 117, art. 5.1.
119. Nisga'a Comprehensive Land Claims Interim Protection Measures Agreement, GOV'TOF
CAN., July 31, 1992, available at http://www.schoolnet.ca/aboriginal/nisgal/ipma-e.html (last
visited Mar. 18, 2005) [hereinafter 1992 Interim Measures].
120. NISGA'A FINAL AGREEMENT, GOV'T OF CAN., APR. 27, 1999, pmbl. at 1, available at
http://www.aine-inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nsgalnisdexl2-e.pdf [hereinafter, NISGA'A AGREEMENT] (In the
text, this article will refer to it as both the Nisga'a Agreement and the Final Agreement.); see also
Greg Joyce, Nisga 'a Approve Treaty by 61% Margin, CAN. PRESS NEWSWIRE, Nov. 12, 1998 (on
file with author) (discussing that the NisgA a Agreement entered into force in 2000, after
ratification by all of the parties, during which members of the Nisga'a Nation voted by a margin of
61% to approve the agreement in November 1998); Scott Sutherland, First Modern-Day Treaty in
BC Passes in Legislature, CAN. PRESS NEWSWIRE, Apr. 22, 1999 (on file with author) (noting that
British Columbia approved the agreement in April 1999); Landmark Nisga 'a Treaty Ratified by the
House of Commons, CAN. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 13, 1999 (on file with author) (noting that it was
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control of 1,992 square kilometers of land and resources are among the most
important. 11 One such provision specifies that the Nisga'a have exclusive
authority over their mineral resources. 22 Through this and similar provisions,
the Nisga'a are enjoying their right to control their land and natural resources.
ii. The Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en: Delgamuukw v. Her
Majesty The Queen
123
Not all indigenous peoples of Canada have enjoyed the success of the
Nisga'a. For example, the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en continue to struggle for
full recognition of their land rights. Their story also differs from the Nisga'a
because they have proceeded primarily by relying on their right of Aboriginal
title. Due to their unique history, the government has recognized the existence
of their title. However, they continue to struggle for the full control of their land
and natural resources.
a. The History of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en
The Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en, whose original territory consisted of 58,000
square kilometers in Northwestern British Columbia,124 share a history similar to
the Nisga'a. Explorers in the region, who began arriving around 1822, found
both tangible and intangible evidence of the indigenous connection to the
territory. 12  The more tangible indicators included totem poles and large feast
halls. 126 The less tangible proof primarily consisted of the oral tradition of each
tribe, known as their adaawk (Gitxsan) and kungax (Wet'suwet'en). 127 Despite
that evidence, the European explorers rendered the same fate upon their tribes as
the Nisga'a. Relying on their adaawk and kungax to preserve and continue their
indigenous cultures into new generations, the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en have
also engaged in a battle to preserve their legal rights as indigenous peoples.
approved by the Canadian federal government after ratification by the House of Commons in
December 1999 and by the Senate in April 2000); Senate Approves Nisga's Treaty, THE NAT'L
CAN. BROADCASTING CORP., Apr. 13, 2000, available at
http://vancouver.cbc.ca/regional/servlet/Viewfilename=bc-nisgaa000413 (last visited Mar. 23,
2005).
121. See NISGA'A AGREEMENT, supra note 120, at 31, 167-68.
122. Id. at 34-35.
123. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
124. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 7.
125. John Borrows, Sovereignty's Alchemy: An Analysis ofDelgamuukw v. British Columbia, 37
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 537, 540 (1999).
126. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 13-14.
127. Id. 1 13 (noting that the adaawk "is a collection of sacred oral tradition" about the history,
ancestors, and territories of the Gitxsan, and the kungax "is a spiritual song or dance or
performance" that connects the Wet'suwet'en to their land).
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b. A Starting Place for Negotiations: The Right of
Aboriginal Title
The fight of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en culminated with a case before
the Supreme Court of Canada, Delgamuukw v. Her Majesty the Queen.128 In
asserting their claim over their land and natural resources, the Gitxsan and
Wet'suwet'en relied on the right of Aboriginal title. At the outset, the greatest
difficulty in asserting this claim was proving their Aboriginal title and the lack of
extinguishment by the government. The Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en had one
primary tool: their adaawk and kungax. Though the lower courts considered
these traditions to be insufficient to establish a right of Aboriginal title, the
Supreme Court took a remarkable step by declaring that indigenous peoples may
use oral traditions, such as the adaawk and kungax, as evidence to prove their
land claims. 129  The Court held that such a fundamental tradition requires
consideration, especially to the extent that it establishes the cultural significance
and historical use and occupation of the land. 130 Furthermore, the Court found
that the cultural method of preserving the oral tradition ensured a degree of
authenticity by incorporating a process of allowing for objections based on
factual inaccuracy.131
Accordingly, the Court ordered a new trial for considering the evidence of
the Gitxsan adaawk and the Wet'suwet'en kungax.132 While the Court affirmed
the right of Aboriginal title, even elaborating on its content, it held that any
decision regarding the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en must fully consider the facts
presented through the oral tradition. At the same time, the Court strongly urged
the parties to pursue a resolution through negotiation rather than continued
litigation. 133 The Court believed that negotiated settlements would ultimately
lead to the most harmonious result. The parties heeded the advice of the Court
and are currently negotiating treaties that honor the Aboriginal title of the
Gitxsan and Wet' suwet' en.
128. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
129. Id. 1193-108.
130. Id. 1 93-94 (finding it error to consider the oral history only as corroborating evidence).
131. Id. 193.
132. Id. 1 107-08.
133. Id. 186 (citing R. v. Van der Peet, [19961 2 S.C.R. 507).
134. See, e.g., First Nations and Tribal Councils in the Treaty Process: Gitxsan Treaty Society,
PROVINCE OF BRIT. COLUM.: TREATY NEGOTIATIONS OFF., at
http://www.gov.bc.ca/tno/negotiation/FirstNations-in the-process/gitxsan.htm (last visited Mar.
23, 2005); see also First Nations and Tribal Councils in the Treaty Process: Wetsuweten,
PROVINCE OF BRIT. COLUM.: TREATY NEGOTIATIONS OFF., at
http://www.gov.bc.ca/tno/negotiation/FirstNationsin_theprocess/wetsuweten.htm (last visited
Mar. 23, 2005) (noting that both tribes are currently in stage four of a six-stage treaty process, and
that in stage four, the parties negotiate an agreement in principle by identifying and defining the
rights and obligations of the parties, which will form the basis of the final treaty).
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C. Beyond Country Examples: A Global Deprivation of Indigenous Land and
Natural Resources, and the Ongoing Struggle to Regain Control
Indigenous peoples worldwide share the historical and ongoing struggle of
the indigenous peoples of Nigeria and Canada. In fact, the emergence of the
modem nation-state in the 1600s moved social development in a direction that
threatened the culture of many indigenous peoples. 13  At that point, the law
shifted to protect only individuals and the sovereign state. 136 Collective entities
other than the state, such as indigenous peoples, received protection only for
"their individual constituents" and not "as distinct communities."
' 137
With the emerging principle of state sovereignty, the new nation-states
further threatened indigenous peoples. 138 States exerted the principle at the
expense of collective entities, such as indigenous peoples, especially when the
right to control land and resources was at issue. Asserting their rights as
sovereigns, European states relied on a policy of terra nullius under which the
first European state to discover indigenous lands asserted control over those
lands, without conquest of, or entering into treaties with, the indigenous
inhabitants. 1
39
Even after centuries of such mistreatment, which led to the near-destruction
of their cultures and societies, 14 indigenous peoples continue to assert their
rights, especially to their land and natural resources. As with the Ogoni, the
struggle may even be increasing in intensity. This renewed fervor is best
understood by considering how governments, such as Nigeria, have adopted
development policies that are increasingly harmful to indigenous peoples. Upon
discovering the value of resources in indigenous lands, such as Ogoni oil,
governments have again asserted their sovereignty as justification to exclude the
indigenous peoples from any policy- and decision-making regarding the resource
extraction.
14v
By failing to consult the indigenous peoples, these governments ignore
indigenous interests and freely engage in policies of exploitation based on only
one set of values. The policies do not incorporate "[t]he cultures of indigenous
peoples [which] typically differ in significant ways from the liberal Western
perspective."' 142 Even in countries such as Nigeria, Western values infiltrated
135. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-14 (1996); see also
HANNUM, supra note 3, at 5-6.
136. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 15.
137. Id.
138. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 19; see also Wiessner, supra note 7, at 76, 98.
139. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 22; see also HANNUM, supra note 3, at 93.
140. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 24, 26; see also HANNUM, supra note 3, at 74-75.
141. PYAGBARA, supra note 41, at 3.
142. Ann Blyberg, Cultural Rights, in CIRCLE OF RIGHTS: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL
RIGHTS ACTIVISM: A TRAINING MANUAL 329, 340 (2000).
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governments and placed capitalist exploitation of resources at the forefront of
their priorities.
Indigenous peoples are now challenging states to re-evaluate their priorities
and to consider that "[a]t times, ecosystem management requires weighing
additional considerations, including even cultural and religious factors when a
specific natural resource... is a necessary element in the preservation of a
group's culture."' 14 3  A primary factor for indigenous peoples, which must
become a priority for states, is the fundamental relationship between indigenous
lands and their cultural identity:
[T]he relationship between indigenous peoples and the land is an essential tie
which provides and maintains the cultural identity of those peoples. One
must understand that the land is not a mere instrument of agricultural
production, but part of a geographic and social, symbolic and religious space,
with which the history and current dynamics of those peoples are linked. 144
Thus, preservation of indigenous land and natural resources is necessary for the
very survival of the indigenous peoples involved.
Another priority of indigenous peoples, considering that their survival
requires survival of the collective entity, is that the ownership of the land and
natural resources must belong to the group. 145 By rearranging their priorities to
ensure the collective right of indigenous peoples to their land and natural
resources, states can help guarantee the survival of indigenous peoples as a
collective group.146 If they continue to ignore indigenous peoples, states will
perpetuate the colonial philosophy and sentence their indigenous peoples to
certain extinction. Such a loss would negatively impact the social and economic
development of the world.
143. EYAL BENVENISTI, SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
OPTIMAL RESOURCE USE 106 (2002); see also Tracey A. LeBeau, Symposium: The State of Native
America and Its Unfolding Self-Governance: Reclaiming Reservation Infrastructure: Regulatory
and Economic Opportunities for Tribal Developments, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 237, 239 (2001).
144. The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of Aug.
31, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, at 24 (2001), available at
http:lwww.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf/seriec-79-esp.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2001).
145. Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615, 658-61 (1992).
146. See WORLD COMMISSION ON CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR CREATIVE DIVERSITY,
REPORT OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT ch. 2.6 (1995), at
http://kvc.minbuza.nl/uk/archive/reportlchapter2_6.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2005) [hereinafter
OUR CREATIVE DIVERSITY].
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Ii1. PROTECTING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: THEIR RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
When considering the fundamental role of their land in the lives and
cultures of indigenous peoples, it is almost unimaginable that states could persist
in denying them any rights to control their land and natural resources. Even
international law failed, until very recently, to provide the most basic protections
for indigenous land rights. This section explores the development of such
protection, from the right of self-determination of "peoples" to the right of
permanent sovereignty for indigenous peoples.
A. A 20th Century Solution for Indigenous Peoples: Self-Determination
The 20th Century brought a seed of change that would ultimately limit state
sovereignty. 147 This change involved an increased focus on individuals and
citizen groups, including indigenous peoples. 148  While state sovereignty
remained extremely important, international law developed principles for
protecting individuals and groups from arbitrary assertions of the rights of
sovereignty. For colonized and indigenous peoples, perhaps the most important
principle to emerge was self-determination.
1. The Right of "Peoples" to Self-Determination
Self-determination developed as a principle of international law during the
period between World War I and World War 11. 149 At this early stage, however,
states applied it only within the limited context of redrawing state boundaries
after World War I. Self-determination emerged in this effort because the
prevailing states, known as the Great Powers, redrew the state boundaries based
on national identity. However, the states recognized self-determination as a
mere principle and applied it as a basis for independent statehood in only two
very narrow circumstances. First, a "nation" could attain independent statehood
only if it existed within the territory of a defeated empire. Second, granting such
independence had to be consistent with the interests of the Great Powers. In
essence, this initial principle of self-determination served merely as a tool for
dismantling harmful regimes.
The atrocities committed under the assertion of ethnic supremacy during
World War II brought the importance of self-determination to the forefront.151
As a result, international law began to develop toward recognizing self-
147. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 39; see also Wiessner, supra note 7, at 99-100.
148. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 40; see also HANNUM, supra note 3, at 22-23.
149. HANNUM, supra note 3, at 27-28.
150. Id. at 28-29.
151. Wiessner, supra note 7, at 99-100.
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determination as a right of peoples. 152 The culmination of all efforts in this
regard was the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples (Declaration on Colonial Countries), which
declared a "right to self-determination"153 for "all peoples."' 154  Despite the
proclamation of the right, the Declaration on Colonial Countries failed to clarify
the breadth of self-determination as a right or to define many of the terms crucial
to its application. For example, the Declaration failed to provide any definition
of who qualifies as "peoples," thus leaving the glaring uncertainty of who are
"all peoples" entitled to the right. 155  In the face of such ambiguity, states
adopted their own limited definitions of the "peoples" to whom the right would
extend. 156  According to state practice, then, the right of self-determination
extended only to peoples of a colonial territory located outside the sovereign
state. 157  This limited the right of self-determination to the context of
decolonizing distant territories.
15
2. Extending the Right of Self-Determination to Indigenous Peoples
With this initial limitation, self-determination offered little support for
indigenous rights. The emergence of such a right was still important because it
showed an ideological shift toward balancing the interests of groups within the
state with those of the state. This philosophical extension of international law
into the realm of internal concerns opened the doors for protecting the rights of
indigenous peoples through a right of self-determination.
a. Developing an International Norm of Indigenous Self-
Determination
To extend the right of self-determination to indigenous peoples, proponents
first had to disprove the claim that indigenous peoples do not qualify as
"peoples." 159 In 1957 the International Labor Organization (ILO) started the
initiative to overcome this obstacle when it declared a right of self-determination
152. HANNUM, supra note 3, at 33.
153. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1961) [hereinafter Declaration on Colonial Countries].
154. Id.
155. HANNUM, supra note 3, at 34-35 (discussing G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp.
No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (197 1), and noting that subsequent declarations failed to clarify
the definition of "peoples").
156. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 43; see also HANNUM, supra note 3, at 36-38.
157. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 43 (referring to the blue water, or salt water, thesis).
158. Id.; see also HANNUM, supra note 3, at 48-49.
159. 1996 Working Paper, supra note 7, 58.
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for indigenous peoples in its Convention Number 107 (Convention 107). 160
Although Convention 107 ultimately failed because it assumed an assimilationist
perspective, the inclusion of a right to self-determination for indigenous peoples
successfully brought the issue of indigenous rights into the forefront of
international legal debate. 161
The ILO continued to be an important player in this debate, especially when
it adopted Convention Number 169 (Convention 169) in 1991.162 Through this
new Convention 169, the ILO revised its previously assimilationist perspective
and shifted toward a position acknowledging the need to return some control to
indigenous peoples by "[r]ecognising the aspirations of these [indigenous]
peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic
development and to maintain and develop their identities, languages and
religions, within the framework of the States in which they live." 163 With this
philosophy, Convention 169 rovides extensive protection of indigenous rights,
including cultural integrity and control over indigenous land and natural
165
resources.
Despite its significant advancement of indigenous rights, Convention 169
revealed additional hurdles for attaining full recognition of an indigenous right to
self-determination. The first indication of these problems arose during the
drafting process. States resisted any reference to indigenous "peoples" because
they feared such usage would confer a right to self-determination that included a
right of secession to independent statehood. 166  To reduce opposition to
Convention 169, the final text adopted a meaning of "peoples" and explicitly
disclaimed that the usage conferred any rights associated with the term under
international law. What states failed to understand was that indigenous peoples
relied on self-determination "as an expression of their desire to continue as
distinct communities free from oppression, while in virtually all instances
denying aspirations to independent statehood."
1 67
160. Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and
Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247 [hereinafter
ILO Cony. 107]; see also ANAYA, supra note 135, at 44 (noting that the ILO is a specialized
agency that is affiliated with the United Nations, even though it actually predates that
organization).
161. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 44-45; see also HANNUM, supra note 3, at 77-78 (noting that,
despite its failures, Convention 107 was a positive step toward recognizing the rights of indigenous
peoples).
162. ILO Cony. 169, supra note 8, art. l(1)(b).
163. Id. pmbl.
164. Id. art. 5.
165. id. arts. 13-19.




Even with such extensive provisions for indigenous rights, Convention 169
may not protect most indigenous peoples because only seventeen countries have
ratified it.168  Therefore, indigenous peoples in non-party states, such as the
countries discussed above, Nigeria and Canada, cannot assert rights against their
governments under Convention 169. Arguably, however, Convention 169 does
contain certain minimum standards for protecting the land rights of indigenous
peoples. These standards apply even to non-party states because even those
governments have "confirm[ed] general acceptance of at least the core aspects of
the land rights norms expressed" in its provisions. 169  Beyond those core
provisions, Convention 169 continues to be important because it is "international
law's most concrete manifestation of the growing responsiveness to indigenous
peoples' demands."
170
The United Nations has also responded increasingly to the claims of
indigenous peoples. The groundwork for its efforts began decades before
Convention 169, in 1971, when the Economic and Social Council authorized the
"Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Peoples."17 1  In
addition to producing extensive information regarding indigenous peoples, the
study proved valuable in ensuring that the issue of indigenous rights remained at
the forefront of international consideration. 172 The United Nations continued to
consider indigenous issues, and in 1982, they established the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations. 173 All of this activity eventually culminated in the Draft
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which promises
to be the most progressive protection of indigenous rights in international law. '
74
168. Convention No. CJ69@ ref was ratified by 17 countries, INT'L LABOUR ORG., at
http:l/www.ilo.orglilolex/cgi-lexiratifce.pl?C 169 (last visited Mar. 23, 2005).
169. James S. Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move Toward
the Multicultural State. 21 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 13, 40 (2004).
170. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 47.
171. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 51; see also HANNUM, supra note 3, at 82 (noting that the U.N.
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities conducted the
study).
172. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 51; see also HANNUM, supra note 3, at 82.
173. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 51 (noting that "[t]he working group is an organ of the
Subcommission" and is comprised of human rights experts, and that its expanded mandate includes
reviewing developments concerning indigenous peoples, developing international standards to
address these concerns, and studying "treaties between indigenous peoples and states").
174. United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Subcomnission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 15, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Draft Declaration]. The working group
completed the first Draft Declaration in 1988. After discussion in several subsequent sessions, the
Working Group submitted its final revision of the Draft in 1993 to its parent bodies within the
United Nations. The Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
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The Draft Declaration boldly protects the rights of indigenous peoples to
self-determination, including control over their land and natural resources:
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development. 
17 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive
spiritual and material relationship with the lands, territories, waters and
coastal seas and other resources which they have traditionally owned or
otherwise occupied or used, and to uphold their responsibilities to future
generations in this regard.1
76
Indigenous peoples have the fight to own, develop, control and use the lands
and territories, including the total environment ... and other resources which
they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. This includes
the right to the full recognition of their laws, traditions and customs, land-
tenure systems and institutions for the development and management of
resources, and the right to effective measures by States to prevent any
interference with, alienation of or encroachment upon these fights.
177
Indigenous peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters
relating to their internal and local affairs, including... land and resources178
management, [and] environment ....
Through such provisions, the Draft Declaration clearly incorporates the interests
of indigenous peoples. Perhaps this improvement over previous instruments
results from the enlightened drafting process, which engaged indigenous peoples
and their representatives in order to avoid any bias. 
179
Although it remains a draft declaration, understating its importance for
protecting indigenous rights would be a mistake. Though not binding,8S the
provisions show an important "convergence of international opinion about the
adopted the Draft and submitted it to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1994. ANAYA,
supra note 135, at 52; see also HANNUM, supra note 3, at 85.
175. Draft Declaration, supra note 174, art. 3.
176. Id. art. 25.
177. Id. art. 26; see also id. arts. 27-30.
178. Id. art. 31; see also id. arts. 32-36.
179. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 52; see also HANNUM, supra note 3, at 84-85.
180. One court in the United States has rejected the distinction between binding and non-binding
international instruments as the sole justification for denying an obligation under an international
instrument. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (1980), the Court stated that "U.N.
declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of member
nations under the Charter."
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content of indigenous peoples' rights."' 18 1 The Draft Declaration may have even
greater weight than that of generally accepted opinion. One scholar suggests that
the Draft Declaration may be binding, to the extent it proves that indigenous
rights have reached the status of customary international law. 182 He bases this
claim on the concept that "explicit communication among authoritative
actors ... is a form of practice that builds customary rules." 1 Under this
theory, development of the customary norm does not require conforming
conduct, although such conduct will serve to strengthen the customary nature of
the norm.
b. Content of the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination
Regardless of the degree to which the Draft Declaration may be binding, it
clearly shows a growing consensus that indigenous peoples have a right to self-
determination. In fact, the Special Rapporteur for the United Nations Working
Group has taken a position in support of this conclusion. In one submission to
the Working Group, she stated that there is no "distinction between 'indigenous'
peoples, and 'peoples' generally."' 184 When combined with the provisions in the
Draft Declaration on self-determination, this statement offers an answer to the
question left open by ILO Convention 169: that indigenous peoples are
"peoples" with a right to self-determination. 185 However, the Draft Declaration
goes further by also providing some guidance as to the meaning of the right to
self-determination for indigenous peoples. For instance, the Draft Declaration
explicitly provides that the right of self-determination necessarily includes a
right to self-government. 186 The Draft Declaration also protects the rights to
cultural integrity and to indigenous control over their land and natural
187
resources.
Through its provisions, the Draft Declaration seems to articulate a right of
self-determination for indigenous peoples that includes a range of human rights
necessary to protect their special interests. Whereas the right of self-
determination as it developed during decolonization was defined by a right of
181. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 55.
182. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 50 (stating that a norm becomes one of customary law when two
elements are met: (1) a uniform state practice, that is (2) followed out of a sense of a legal
obligation).
183. Id.
184. 1996 Working Paper, supra note 7, $ 72.
185. Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Spirit and Letter of the Right to Self-Determination of Indigenous
Peoples: Reflections on the Making of the United Nations Draft Declaration, in
OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION 67, 74 (Pekka
Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000) [hereinafter The Spirit and Letter].
186. Draft Declaration, supra note 174, art. 31.
187. See, e.g., id. arts. 4, 25-30.
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secession, the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples must be defined
by those rights that are necessary to ensure their control over their own destinies
within the existing state. Through the drafting of the Declaration, states have
come to understand how the right of self-determination is adjustable to meet the
particular aspects of indigenous claims without conferring a right to secession.
When such distinctions became clear, the states participating in the drafting
process showed an increased willingness to acknowledge the existence of ano • . 188
indigenous right to self-determination. Thus, rather than linking self-
determination forever with a right of secession, the Draft Declaration shows how
international law is developing to recognize a right of indigenous peoples to self-
determination that consists of such rights as nondiscrimination, cultural integrity,
and control of their land and natural resources.
1 9
B. The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Permanent Sovereignty over Their
Natural Resources - A Right Interconnected to Self-Determination
The right of indigenous peoples to self-determination naturally leads to an
indigenous fight to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. 190 This
section will explore the right of permanent sovereignty, beginning with a brief
history of the fight as it applied in the context of decolonization. It will then
consider how international law is expanding that right to indigenous peoples.
Understanding the right to permanent sovereignty will help clarify how rural
electric cooperatives can serve as a model for fulfilling the right.
1. History of the Right of Permanent Sovereignty
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources began as a
principle of decolonization and an essential aspect of self-determination.
19 1
Accordingly, it evolved after World War II as a principle that "underscore[d] the
claim of colonial peoples and developing countries to the right to enjoy the
benefits of resource exploitation and in order to allow 'inequitable' legal
arrangements ... to be altered or even to be annulled ab initio, because they
188. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 80, 86-87 (discussing how the Australian and United States
delegates, before meeting with the Working Group, expressed increasing acceptance of the concept
of the right to self-determination); see also Wiessner, supra note 7, at 93, 116.
189. ANAYA, supra note 135, at 97-112 (elaborating on each of these rights); see also HANNUM,
supra note 3, at 91-103 (discussing the claims of indigenous peoples to land rights and self-
determination).
190. SCHRIJVER, supra note 4, at 1-3.
191. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Statement on "Indigenous Peoples' Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources" before the Second Session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues,
INT'L INDIAN TREATY COUNCIL, May 20, 2003, at





conflicted with the concept of permanent sovereignty. Just as with the right
of self-determination, this early concept of permanent sovereignty applied to all
"peoples." In its Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,
the United Nations General Assembly declared it as a right in 1962: "The right
of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of
the well-being of the people of the State concerned."' 193 A few years later, the
General Assembly declared that the right to development is an inalienable
human right, the full realization of which requires "the exercise of [a people's]
inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and
resources." 194 In fact, more than eighty resolutions have covered the right to
permanent sovereignty. 195  As with self-determination, however, the right to
permanent sovereignty was initially limited to "peoples" in the context of
decolonization.
2. Extension to Indigenous Peoples
Recent years have seen another similarity between the rights of self-
determination and permanent sovereignty: the extension of the right to
indigenous peoples. The Special Rapporteur to the United Nations Working
Group considers the right of indigenous peoples to control their land and natural
resources to be "a critical and necessary step for the advancement of the rights of
indigenous peoples." 196  The Rapporteur further believes "that meaningful
political and economic self-determination of indigenous peoples will never be
possible without indigenous peoples' having the legal authority to exercise
control over their lands and territories."'
197
In a statement before the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues, the Special Rapporteur elaborated on her position and offered five
reasons why the basic principle of permanent sovereignty should extend to
indigenous peoples:
192. SCHRUVER, supra note 4, at 1.
193. G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
194. G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53
(1986).
195. Indigenous Peoples' Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, Working Paper by
Erica-Irene A. Daes, former Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations, U.N. Subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 54th Sess.,
at Prov. Agenda Item 5(b) 6, U.N. Doc. EICN.41Sub.212002123 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Working
Paper].
196. Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur, Erica-lrene A. Daes, Subcommission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 55th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4fSub.2/2003/20
(2003) [hereinafter 2003 Preliminary Report].
197. Id. 6.
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(a) Indigenous peoples are colonized peoples in the historical, economic and
political sense;
(b) Indigenous peoples suffer from unfair and unequal economic
arrangements typically suffered by other colonized peoples;
(c) The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is necessary
to level the economic and political playing field and to provide protection
against unfair and oppressive economic arrangements;
(d) Indigenous peoples have a right to development and actively to participate
in the realization of this right; sovereignty over their natural resources is an
essential prerequisite for this;
(e) The natural resources originally belonged to the indigenous peoples198
concerned and were not freely and fairly given up.
Thus, an indigenous right of permanent sovereignty is necessary both: (1) as a
remedy of past and continuing denial of the "prior and paramount rights" of
indigenous peoples over their land and natural resources; and (2) as a tool for the
future advancement of indigenous peoples and their cultures.' 99 To accomplish
these dual goals, indigenous peoples must enjoy a sovereignty that includes
"legal, governmental control or management authority over natural
resources."2°
a. Source of the Permanent Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples
Even in the face of such compelling justifications for the permanent
sovereignty of indigenous peoples, states may claim that no international legal
obligation exists to support such a right. This argument fails to consider that,
from the very beginning, permanent sovereignty has developed as a corollary of
the right to self-determination. As shown by' the following instruments,
international law has developed significant protections for indigenous peoples,
including their right to self-determination and the related rights of
nondiscrimination, cultural integrity, and property.
198. Daes Statement, supra note 191.
199. 2003 Preliminary Report, supra note 196, 4.
200. Daes Statement, supra note 191.
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i. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal
Declaration)20 1
The Universal Declaration is the primary document in which the United
Nations established subsequent human rights norms. 20 2 As such, it addresses all
of the rights related to indigenous peoples' permanent sovereignty, except self-
determination. Despite that omission, the Universal Declaration recognizes the
rights of property, cultural integrity, and nondiscrimination: Article 17
guarantees to everyone "the right to own property alone as well as in association
with others" 20 3 and protects all persons against arbitrary deprivation of that right;
Article 27 affirms the right of everyone "freely to participate in the cultural life
of the community"; a2 4 Article 7 states that "[a]ll are equal before the law," andas such, "are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination." 20 5
ii. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR)
206
As one of the two primary documents flowing from the Universal
Declaration, the ICESCR filled the gap regarding self-determination. Article 1
proclaims that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination," including the
right to "freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources."' z 7 The ICESCR
goes further in this protection, confirming in Article 25 that no other rights in the
Covenant "shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to
enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources. ' 2° 8  In
201. A Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., pt. 1,
at 7 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; see also LOUIS HENKIN ET AL.,
HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 41 (2001) (noting that the Declaration was essentially
adopted without objection: forty-nine states voted in favor of the Declaration; eight abstained; and
none voted against).
202. Human Rights Here and Now: Celebrating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at
http://wwwl .umn.edulhumanrts/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Intro/using.htm (last visited Mar.
6, 2004) [hereinafter Human Rights Here and Now] (noting that as a resolution, states would
generally consider its provisions nonbinding; however, states have come to respect it so much that
it now represents customary international law).
203. Universal Declaration, supra note 201, art. 17.
204. Id. art. 27.
205. Id. art. 7.
206. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Oct. 5, 1977, art. 1,993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCRI; see also OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES (Nov. 2, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.chlpdf/report.pdf (last visited Mar. 23,
2005) [hereinafter STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS] (noting that states have shown significant support
for the ICESCR: as of November 2, 2003, 148 states have become parties); id. (showing that both
of the country examples used in this article, Nigeria and Canada, are parties to the ICESCR).
207. ICESCR, supra note 206, art. 1.
208. Id. art. 25.
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addition to the right of self-determination, the ICESCR also recognizes the rights
to cultural integrity and nondiscrimination. Thus, Article 15(l)(a) asserts "the
right of everyone. . [t]o take part in cultural life," 20 9 while Article 2(2)
prohibits "discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status."
210
iii. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) 211
The ICCPR shares at least two protections with the ICESCR, including
their common Article 1 recognizing the right of self-determination and a similar
nondiscrimination provision in Article 2(a). However, the ICCPR goes further
in protecting the right of cultural integrity, ensuring in Article 27 that "persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise
their own religion, or to use their own language."
212
iv. ILO Convention Number 169 Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (Convention
169)213
Perhaps the most comprehensive instrument to date is one already
discussed: ILO Convention 169. This Convention extends these rights of
property, cultural integrity, and self-determination to indigenous peoples.
Moreover, it explicitly recognizes indigenous rights over their land and natural
resources. Article 14 protects "[tihe rights of ownership and possession of the
peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy," requiring
states to "take steps as necessary ... to guarantee effective protection of their
rights of ownership and possession. ' 214 Similarly, Article 15(1) requires states
to safeguard "[tihe rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources
pertaining to their lands."2 15 This provision specifically requires that "[t]hese
rights include the right of these peoples to participate in the use, management
209. Id. art. 15.
210. Id. art. 2.
211. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Oct. 5, 1977, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]; see also STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS, supra note 206 (noting that, as with the
ICESCR, the number of states party to the ICCPR show overwhelming support: as of November 2,
2003, the CCPR had entered into force for 151 states); id. (showing that both country examples
used in this article are also parties to the ICCPR).
212. ICCPR, supra note 211, art. 27.
213. ILO Cony. 169, supra note 8.
214. Id. art. 14.
215. Id. art. 15(1).
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and conservation of these resources. ' 216 Though the Convention allows for
states to retain ultimate control, Article 15(2) obligates the states that do so to
"establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these
peoples.. . before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration
or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands."
'217
The Convention makes clear that these rights to land and natural resources
are closely related to the right of cultural integrity. Article 13(1) establishes that
the protections of land and natural resources are necessary to "respect the special
importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their
relationship with the lands or territories. '218 This cultural importance requires
that states allow indigenous peoples "to decide their own priorities for the
process of development" in order to ascertain how it will affect their culture.
219
However, their rights to property extend beyond the right to decide cultural
priorities to include a right to the economic benefits of their property ownership.
Accordingly, Article 15(2) requires that, where possible, states must ensure that
indigenous peoples "participate in the benefits of such activities, and ... receive
fair compensation for any damages" resulting from the exploitation of their lands
and natural resources.
Convention 169 goes beyond these elaborate protections of the property and
cultural rights of indigenous peoples. Thus, for example, Article 3(1) requires
that states ensure indigenous peoples receive "the full measure of human rights
and fundamental freedoms without hindrance or discrimination." 221 By bringing
together all of these principles and providing such broad protections, the
Convention provides a standard for protecting the rights of indigenous peoples.
v. United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Draft Declaration)222
The Draft Declaration goes even further to protect the rights necessary to
ensure permanent sovereignty: "Recognizing the urgent need to respect and
promote the inherent rights and characteristics of indigenous peoples, especially
their rights to their lands, territories and resources, which derive from their
political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual
traditions, histories and philosophies. '223 Accordingly, the Draft Declaration
incorporates all of the rights protected by the above instruments, including the
216. Id.
217. Id. art. 15(2).
218. Id. art. 13(1).
219. ILO Conv. 169, supra note 8, art. 7(1).
220. Id. art. 15(2).
221. Id. art. 3(1).
222. Draft Declaration, supra note 174.
223. Id. pmbl.
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rights of property (Articles 10, 25-30), cultural integrity (Articles 4, 6-9, 12-14),
self-determination (Article 3), and nondiscrimination (Article 2). In the property
provisions of Part VI, the Draft Declaration clearly draws these protections
together. For example, Article 25 connects property rights to cultural integrity,
recognizing the right of indigenous peoples "to maintain and strengthen their
distinctive spiritual and material relationship with the lands ... and other
resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or
used."'224 Another provision declares that, "as a specific form of exercising their
right to self-determination, [indigenous peoples] have the right to autonomy or
self-government in matters relating to their... land and resources
management."
225
To ensure the realization of these rights, the Draft Declaration empowers
indigenous peoples with:
the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the
development or use of their lands, territories and other resources, including
the right to require that States obtain their free and informed consent prior to
the approval of any project affecting their lands, territories and other
resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or
. 226
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.
The protections of the Draft Declaration even go so far as to require positive
state assistance for indigenous peoples' develo ment, including conservation and
restoration of their land and environment. 22  Through these protections, the
Draft Declaration provides a basis for the right of indigenous peoples to
permanent sovereignty.
b. Content and Measurement of the Right
These international legal instruments show that international law is moving
to protect the right of indigenous peoples to permanent sovereignty. Though
many states cling to the historical limitation of permanent sovereignty to
sovereign states, developments in recent decades are moving to recognize it as a
224. id. art. 25.
225. Id. art. 31.
226. Id. art. 30 (emphasis added); see also id. art. 26 (noting that states are required to protect
indigenous land rights against "any interference with, alienation of or encroachment upon these
rights").
227. Draft Declaration, supra note 174, art. 27; see also id. art. 38 (clarifying that "assistance"
includes both technical and financial assistance, and is in addition to the requirement of restitution
of indigenous lands); id. art. 27 (providing for the restitution of land and resources that have been
"confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without... [the indigenous peoples'] free and informed
consent"); id. (stating that such restitution should involve the return of the land or resources, or
where return is not possible, giving just and fair compensation in the form of other "lands,
territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status").
[Vol. 12:2
RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
right of indigenous peoples. 22 This international recognition is based largely on
the notion that, as the possessors of the land from "time immemorial,"
indigenous peoples have an ownership right that takes priority over that of the
state.229 However, this emerging norm of permanent sovereignty for indigenous
peoples does not remove indigenous resources from ultimate state control: the
sovereign state retains the final power of deciding issues concerning the land and
resources in its territory, including those belonging to indigenous peoples.
230
Thus, for example, Article 15(2) of ILO Convention 169 recognizes that some
states may choose to "retain[] the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources
or rights to other resources pertaining to lands."
231
Despite this retention of ultimate sovereignty with the state, the provisions
discussed above establish a minimum standard for the right of indigenous
peoples to permanent sovereignty. The most basic element flows from the right
of all peoples to be treated equally, free of any discrimination. Pursuant to the
principle of nondiscrimination, which virtually every instrument of international
law has guaranteed to all human beings, states cannot exercise their authority
against indigenous peoples in a way that is discriminatory. 232 Thus, a state must
respect indigenous peoples' permanent sovereignty with the same protections
extended to all other property owners. Accordingly, the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination forcefully calls upon States to act by:
[P]rotect[ing] the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and
use their communal lands, territories and resources and, where they have been
deprived of their lands and territories traditionally owned or otherwise
inhabited or used without their free and informed consent, to take steps to
return those lands and territories.
233
Beyond this basic principle, international law has evolved to extend even
greater protection for indigenous peoples' permanent sovereignty. Even while
acknowledging state sovereignty, both ILO Convention 169 and the Draft
Declaration require states to consult the affected indigenous peoples, "with a
view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be
228. 2002 Working Paper, supra note 195, 1$ 2-3; see also SCHRUVER, supra note 4, at 8-9; 2003
Preliminary Report, supra note 196, 11-21; ANAYA, supra note 135, at 107; HANNUM, supra
note 3, at 465-66.
229. Roger Plant, Land Rights, in CIRCLE OF RIGHTS: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL RIGHTS
AcTivisM: A TRAINING MANUAL 349, 356 (2000).
230. 2003 Preliminary Report, supra note 196, 11.
231. ILO Cony. 169, supra note 8, art. 15(2).
232. General Recommendation 23: Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp.
No. 18, at 122, U.N. Doc. A/52/18, Annex V (1997) [hereinafter Recommendation 23]; see also
ANAYA, supra note 135, at 106.
233. Recommendation 23, supra note 232, 5.
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prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration
or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands." 234 Through these
provisions, international law has developed to require that states balance their
own sovereign interests with the permanent sovereignty of indigenous peoples.
In doing so, states must, at a minimum, consult the indigenous peoples and
obtain their consent for any exploration or exploitation of natural resources,
either on indigenous lands or in a way that will affect indigenous lands and
natural resources.
235
c. Fulfilling the Right of Indigenous Peoples' Permanent Sovereignty:
A Cooperative Effort
For indigenous peoples to realize their permanent sovereignty, the
international community must pull together all of its constituent actors. The
Draft Declaration articulates this need, considering international cooperation
essential to realizing "the conservation, restoration, and protection" of
indigenous peoples' permanent sovereignty. 236 At the outset, the most important
step may be government efforts to set up systems for involving the indigenous
peoples at every stage in the decision-making process. Specific programs that
states can adopt include complaint mechanisms for indigenous peoples and
monitoring strategies that ensure development activities do not go beyond the
scope of indigenous consent. 237 States can also contribute by supporting the
Draft Declaration and by ratifying other instruments that protect indigenous
rights.2
38
However, state action is not enough for true success. Non-governmental
actors must also cooperate. Corporations can get involved by engaging in
dialogue with indigenous peoples and incorporating their interests into official
corporate policies and practices. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can
also help, especially by promoting indigenous peoples' rights to all of the parties
involved, including states, private companies, and indigenous peoples
themselves.
239
Some organizations are leading the way in these efforts. In fact, the World
Bank has been very active. One example of its efforts is Operational Directive
234. ILO Conv. 169, supra note 8, art. 15(2); see also Draft Declaration, supra note 174, art. 30
(providing for the right of indigenous peoples "to require that States obtain their free and informed
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands, territories and other resources").
235. 2003 Preliminary Report, supra note 196, 1 6; see also HANNUM, supra note 3, at 466.
236. Draft Declaration, supra note 174, art. 28.
237. Santosa, supra note 50, at 293.
238. BRUCE, supra note 1, at 91.
239. Id. at 91-92.
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4.20 (the Directive), entitled "Indigenous Peoples." 240 The objectives of the
Directive are to ensure that indigenous peoples benefit from Bank projects, and
to avoid the adverse effects of those projects on indigenous peoples. 241The
Directive also establishes guidelines for starting development plans, particularly
by including indigenous peoples in the creation and implementation of the
projects, and for protecting their land and other rights. 24 2
IV. OVERVIEW OF RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES: SETTING UP THE MODEL
The Rural Electric Cooperatives (RECs) of the United States provide a
model for implementing the necessary cooperation of all parties involved in the
development of indigenous land and natural resources. In fact, the RECs have
actively applied the principle of cooperation throughout their long history.
Through multiple stages of continuing development and collaboration, the RECs
show how parties with apparently divergent interests may participate in a
cooperative system that benefits all.
Initially, RECs began as a system involving only the United States
government and the rural residents of America, especially farmers. However, as
time passed, private corporations also became involved, especially through
processes such as the "Cardinal Concept." By considering the progression of
RECs through these relationships, first with the government and later with
profit-motivated utilities, this section provides a background for understanding
the similarity of interests between the RECs and indigenous peoples.
240. The World Bank Operational Manual: Operational Directive 4.20: Indigenous Peoples,
WORLD BANK, September 1991, available at
http://wbnOOl8.worldbank.org[Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf//0F7D6F3F04DD703985256
72C007D08ED?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 24, 2005) [hereinafter World Bank Operational
Manual].
241. Id. T 2.
242. Id. 14, 15. Recently, the World Bank acted even more boldly. After a review of its
participation in extractive industries such as mining, the World Bank is contemplating withdrawal
from projects that do not adequately respect the right of indigenous peoples to control their land
and natural resources. Press Release no. 2005/50/IFC, World Bank Group, World Bank Group
Board Agrees Way Forward on Extractive Industries Review (Aug. 3, 2004), at
http:/Iwww.ifc.org/ifcext/eir.nsf/contentlpressrelease2 (last visited Mar. 24, 2005); see also EMIL
SALIM, STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REVIEW
VOL.1 ix-xii (2003), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/ogmc/files/eirreport/volumelenglish.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2005)
(suggesting that the World Bank participate only in those projects that will contribute to the global
reduction of poverty and noting that this will require, among other things, respecting the human
rights of indigenous peoples).
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A. A Description of Rural Electric Cooperatives
Rural Electric Cooperatives have imported the cooperative form, which has
been used for many other purposes, into the public utility industry. 243 Generally,
a cooperative is "an enterprise or organization owned by and operated for the
benefit of those using its services." 244  An electric cooperative is one
"incorporated under state law as a private and independent, not-for-profit
business that is owned by the members it serves and governed by a board of
directors that is elected by the membership. ' '245 Based on this description, RECs
have five distinct structural features: (1) private, independent, nonprofit electric
utility businesses, (2) incorporated under laws of the state of operation, (3)
established to provide at-cost electricity, (4) owned by the consumers they serve,
and (5) governed by a board of directors elected by and from the membership. 246
The two most distinct of these characteristics are that the purpose of the RECs is
to provide at-cost electricity to its members and that consumers own the
243. The term "public utility" describes an industry that supplies vital services to society, subject
to rate and other regulations, which derives benefit from additional regulation that protects them
from competition. PUBLIC UTILITIES REPORTS, INC., ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES: ON THE THRESHOLD
OF A NEW ERA 4 (1996) [hereinafter PURl]. Examples include water, gas, and transportation
utilities, but this article focuses on the supply of electricity. Regulations protect public utilities in
this regard because they are "natural monopolies," meaning that the costs associated with
production and distribution are so high that the government has supported monopolies in order to
protect the utilities. Id. at 5; but see, e.g., id. at 113-14 (noting that the 1990s brought a change
with deregulation of many of the public utilities); id. at 114-15 (explaining that the changes of the
1990s were not universal and generally excepted rural electric cooperatives); Greg Kline, UI Prof
Warns of Downside of Electric Deregulation, THE NEWS-GAZETTE CHAMPAIGN, Nov. 13, 2000, at
Al.
244. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 255 (10th ed. 1995); see also PURl, supra
note 242, at 3. The purpose of forming a cooperative is to increase the members' buying power:
"[m]ost commonly, consumers join together to purchase something that otherwise is not cost-
effectively available to them." National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2002 Orientation
Session for new First-Term Distribution System Directors 1 (2002) (unpublished training manual
on file with author) [hereinafter NRECA].
245. NRECA, supra note 243, at 4.
246. About Electric Cooperatives, TOUCHSTONE ENERGY COOPERATIVES, at
http://www.touchstoneenergy.com/TouchstoneEnergy.cornwho we are/who-about.html (last
visited Mar. 24, 2005) [hereinafter TOUCHSTONE, About Electric Cooperatives]; see also 64 AM.
JUR. 2D Public Utilities § 4 (2003) (explaining the factors that distinguish a cooperative from a
public utility). Elections are guided by the regulation of the individual cooperatives, which always
preserve the principle of one vote per member. See, e.g., Firelands Rural Electric Cooperative,
Inc., Code of Regulations, art. II, § 7 (2003) (unpublished business regulations on file with author)
[hereinafter FREC, Code of Regulations].
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RECs. 24 7 As a result, the RECs must return any "profits" not used to improve or
maintain operations to the consumer-owners.
RECs are also distinct because of their seven guiding principles:
(1) Voluntary and Open Membership: membership is voluntary and open
to all persons who are willing to accept membership responsibilities
and who are located within the cooperative's operating territory;
(2) Democratic Member Control: members elect representatives to their
REC Board;
250
(3) Members' Economic Participation: members contribute equally to the
cooperative's capital;
(4) Autonomy and Independence: cooperatives are autonomous and
member-controlled;
(5) Education, Training, and Information: cooperatives will educate and
train the members, elected representatives, managers, and employees;
(6) Cooperation Among Cooperatives: cooperatives improve both the
cooperative movement and service to their members by working
together on local, state, regional, and national levels; and
(7) Concern for Community: cooperatives work to promote sustainable
development and to further other community interests.
251
247. TOUCHSTONE, About Electric Cooperatives, supra note 246 (noting that investor-owned
utilities (IOUs), on the other hand, operate to maximize shareholder profits); see also FREC, Code
of Regulations, supra note 246, art. VII.
248. TOUCHSTONE, About Electric Cooperatives, supra note 246; see also PURI, supra note 243,
at 83-84.
249. Cooperative Principles, TOUCHSTONE ENERGY COOPERATIVES, at
http://www.touchstoneenergy.com/TouchstoneEnergy.corn/who we-are/who-principles.html (last
visited Mar. 24, 2005) [hereinafter TOUCHSTONE, Cooperative Principles]; see also NRECA, supra
note 244, at 3; PURl, supra note 243, at 4.
250. Each member has one vote in the elections. See, e.g., PURI, supra note 243, at 7.
251. Pursuant to this last principle, RECs are very active in community development and
revitalization projects, assisting in efforts to develop small businesses, create new jobs, improve
water and sewer systems, and deliver health care and educational services. TOUCHSTONE, About
Electric Cooperatives, supra note 246; see also Commitment to Communities, TOUCHSTONE
ENERGY COOPERATIVES, at
http://www.touchstoneenergy.com/TouchstoneEnergy.com/who we-are/whocommitment.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2005) [hereinafter TOUCHSTONE, Commitment to Communities].
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B. The History of Rural Electric Cooperatives25 2
As already suggested, the RECs have developed through different stages.
Each stage presents a different aspect that is valuable in applying this model to
indigenous peoples' permanent sovereignty. The first, which began with the
Rural Electrification Act of 1936, is important because it shows cooperation
between a government and a segment of its citizenry to which it has previously
given little regard. Through that relationship, the United States government
actually empowered rural America to move to the second phase. In that phase,
the RECs extended their partnerships to include not only the government, but
also profit-motivated corporations.
1. Government Creation: The Rural Electrification Act of 1936
In 1935, less than twenty percent of Ohio farms had electricity, and most of
those were close to towns and existing power lines. 253 Investor-owned utilities
(IOUs)254 were reluctant to extend service into rural areas without a serious
financial commitment from the rural residents, who were primarily farmers.
255
They had two reasons for their reluctance. First, such investment would be
costly because there were so few customers per mile of electrical line. Second,
the IOUs believed farm families would neither use enough electricity to justify
the expense, nor be able to afford such use if it was available. 256 Relying on
these factors, IOUs determined that such investment was not within the
economic interest of their stockholders.
When Franklin D. Roosevelt became President, he decided that the
government would step in where the IOUs refused to act. The first effort to this
end was the Tennessee Valley Authority Act (1933), which authorized the
building of electric lines "to serve 'farms and small villages that are not
otherwise supplied with electricity at reasonable rates."' '257 President Rooseveltthen brought the cooperative movement fully to life by establishing the Rural
252. This section, as well as the analysis below, focuses on RECs in the state of Ohio. Though
Ohio has had some unique experiences, it is generally representative of the cooperative movement
throughout the United States. See generally OHIO RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, INC., THE
LIGHT AND THE POWER: COMMEMORATING 50 YEARS OF ELECTRICITY IN RURAL OHIO iii-v (1985)
[hereinafter OREC] (discussing the history of RECs).
253. Id. at iii.
254. Investor-owned utilities are utilities privately owned by shareholders. See PURI, supra note
243, at 8. They are distinct from cooperatives in this aspect, as well as in the fact that shareholders
need not live in the company's service area or purchase power from the company. Id.
255. OREC, supra note 252, at iii. The IOUs would only provide such services if farmers would
pay costs of construction, which at the time, could be as high as $2,000 per mile. Farmers could
not afford such amounts. id. at 15.
256. Id.; see also PURl, supra note 243, at 13.
257. OREC, supra note 252, at iii (quoting from the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16
U.S.C. § 831 (i) (2003)).
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Electrification Administration (REA) in 1935.258 As part of the New Deal,
Roosevelt originally established the REA to help create jobs and relieve
unemployment. As the need for rural electrification became more apparent, the
REA shifted its focus to electrifying rural America as an end in itself.
259
Congress came aboard with this policy initiative, making the REA a permanent
agency with the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (REAct). 26  The REAct
promoted rural electrification by establishing a government funding source
through which rural electric cooperatives could obtain loans for building electric
transmission lines in rural areas.
After the REAct established a firm basis of government support, proponents
turned to the task of getting farm families to join the RECs. Membership
required the farmers to sign a membership certificate, pay a five dollar
membership fee, and grant a right-of-way for the cooperative to place
transmission lines on their property. 63 Because many farmers were eager to get
electricity, supporters recruited members quickly. 264 After sufficient numbers
joined, the farmers organized their RECs as nonprofit corporations under state
law.265 The RECs then applied to the REA for federal loans, which they used to
construct the lines that brought electrification to rural America.
266
The process was a remarkable success. From 1935 to 1937, electrification
on Ohio farms doubled, increasing from 18.7% to 36.6%. By 1950, almost
every farm in Ohio had electricity. Although the government loans provided the
capital for bringing electrification to these farms, the commitment of the
individual REC members - the farmers - was "the dynamic, irrepressible force
258. Id. at 13 (noting that President Roosevelt established the REA through Executive Order 7037
on May 11, 1935).
259. Id. at 13-14.
260. Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. § 901 (2003) [hereinafter REAct]; see also
OREC, supra note 252, at iv (explaining that the REAct made permanent the previously temporary
REA Administrator).
261. OREC, supra note 252, at iv; see also PURI, supra note 243, at 14.
262. OREC, supra note 252, at 12-13.
263. As compared to the capital investment that the IOUs demanded, the $5 membership fee was
minimal. OREC, supra note 252, at 15-16. The IOUs-demanded the farmers cover the $2,000 cost
of building the lines. One of the reasons the RECs were able to require less up-front investment
from the farmers was the cooperatives used techniques that reduced the cost of installing lines to
$600-900 per mile. Id.
264. Id. at 12-13.
265. Id. at 14.
266. Id. at 12. At this early stage, Ohio established thirty cooperatives that borrowed $5.5 million
in REA loans. The cooperatives used those loans to construct more than 5,000 miles of electrical
lines throughout rural Ohio. Id. at 13. By the year 1985, the REA had loaned $20 billion to RECs
nationwide; perhaps even more astonishing than this high amount was the fact that the RECs had
repaid all but $44,000 of those loans. Id at 121.
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behind the program. ' 267 Without their commitment, the loan program would
have remained an untapped resource.
2. Private-Sector Expansion: the "Cardinal Concept"
Despite the early success of the RECs, they served a limited role during this
initial stage of electrification, operating as distribution-only cooperatives.
268
Providing electricity requires two other functions besides distribution: generation
and transmission.269 Initially, RECs had to contract with other utility companies
to obtain electricity. 27 Because they had nothing to offer these other companies,
the RECs had little power with which to bargain for wholesale electricity at
reasonable rates.
27 1
Of all the problems the RECs faced, the issue of rates was their primary
concern. 272  Initial efforts to increase their buying power concentrated on
banding individual cooperatives together into larger organizations, such as the
Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives, Inc. (OREC). OREC's mission is "[tlo aid,
promote and assist a program of rural electrification in the state of Ohio...
[and] to engage in any activity necessary, convenient and proper to the economic
distribution of electric energy to the inhabitants of rural areas in the State of
Ohio.'273 With this mission, OREC operated under the belief that cooperatives
could increase their buying power by working together in large numbers,
thereby, obtaining cheaper electricity rates from their suppliers.
274
After some initial success of increasing their buying power through such
collaborative efforts, the RECs soon realized they could maintain low-cost
electricity supplies over the long-term only if they became power generators, and
not just distributors. 275 With this in mind, Ohio's RECs began to research the
267. OREC, supra note 252, at 60.
268. Id. at 18.
269. PURI, supra note 243, at 9 (explaining that the steps involved in electrical power
distribution are: (1) generation, or the production of electricity, (2) transmission, in which
companies send the generated electricity from the generating source to distribution facilities in the
geographic area where it will be used, and (3) distribution, where utilities deliver the electricity to
their consumers).
270. NRECA, supra note 244, at I (noting that they turned mostly to IOUs and municipal
utilities, which are owned by city governments who usually sell the services to persons within the
city); see also OREC, supra note 252, at 17.
271. OREC, supra note 252, at 18.
272. Id. at 62; see also id. at 61 (explaining that other problems included personnel concerns,
training for employees and management, and labor relations).
273. What is OREC?: The history of the Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives, Inc. (OREC),
BUCKEYE POWER, at http://www.buckeyepower.comlabout-orec_history.asp (last visited Mar. 25,
2005) [hereinafter BUCKEYE, What is OREC?].
274. OREC, supra note 252, at 62, 66.
275. Id. at 73-74.
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viability of building their own generating plant. 276 Their research led to the
creation of "a statewide generation and transmission cooperative," Buckeye
Power, Inc., in 1959.277 Buckeye Power's primary goal was to either purchase
an existing source of power for OREC, or build a generating plant of its own for
that purpose. 278 Either outcome would help the Ohio RECs continue to provide
their members with low-cost electricity by allowing them to generate their own
power rather than having to meet the price demands of other suppliers.
IOUs resisted the REC efforts to find or develop their own source of
generation because, if successful, the IOUs would lose the profits from selling
their electric surpluses to the RECs. In addition, IOUs might lose further profits
if other companies switched and began purchasing electricity from generation
RECs. One utility, Ohio Power Company, along with its parent corporation,
American Electric Power (AEP), proved to be more of a visionary than its
competitors when it entered negotiations with Buckeye Power in 1961.279 AEP
acknowledged that rural electric cooperatives were permanent players in the
utility industry, and therefore, was able to see the potential for a mutually
beneficial relationship. 28  The negotiations between the two entities continued
for several years, until they finally resulted in the Cardinal Concept in 1963.281
The Cardinal Concept was one of the first and best examples of cooperation
between RECs and IOUs. The partnership was revolutionary because it was the
first time a profit-motivated private utility agreed to collaborate with a REC to
build a generating facility. 282 Also, the fact that both groups were willing to
come to the negotiating table with a good faith commitment to understanding,
problem-solving, and mutual respect for each other's rights and interests was
remarkable. 283 This attitude allowed the parties to negotiate a final agreement
that would prove beneficial for both sides.284 The parties announced the final
agreement on October 28, 1963.285
276. Id. at 67.
277. What is Buckeye Power?: History, BUCKEYE POWER, at
http://www.buckeyepower.com/aboutbphistory.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2005) [hereinafter
BUCKEYE, History of Buckeye Power]; see also OREC, supra note 252, at 67.
278. OREC, supra note 252, at 73.
279. Id. at 67.
280. Id. at 75.
281. Id. at 72; see also PURl, supra note 243, at 54.
282. OREC, supra note 252, at 72. The Cardinal Concept was also revolutionary because AEP
required Buckeye Power to obtain funding from private sources rather than through the federal
loan program. Historically, cooperatives had been unable to obtain private financing. Id. at 72-73
American Electric Power helped overcome this hurdle by pledging its own credit to secure funding
from private sources. Id at 78.
283. Id. at 75.
284. Id. at 76. The benefits that both parties enjoyed were not just economical; they also learned
from one another's practical successes. For example, AEP realized the value of reaching out to
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Until that point, the Cardinal Concept existed primarily as a theory for
cooperation between RECs and IOUs. With the groundbreaking of the Cardinal
Power Plant on November 4, 1963, 286 the Cardinal Concept took physical shape.
The Cardinal Power Station included two identical generating units, with Ohio
Power and Buckeye Power each owning one unit.287 Buckeye Power could use
its unit to supply Ohio's RECs with the electricity they required, ensuring low-
cost rates for the cooperative members.
Although assuring affordable consumer rates was an important result, the
enduring lesson of the Cardinal Concept is its standard for industry cooperation.
Thus, many considered Cardinal the dawn of "a new era" in which rural electric
cooperatives and investor-owned utilities worked together in mutually beneficial
relationships. 288 Such cooperation among previous industry antagonists proved
that groups with divergent interests could work together toward a common goal.
The RECs have continued to thrive as a result: since Buckeye Power built the
first generation cooperative in Ohio, RECs have expanded to include 867
distribution cooperatives and sixty-four generation and transmission
289cooperatives in forty-seven states. Now called the Rural Utilities Service, the
REA continues to administer government programs that assist the RECs. 290 The
ongoing importance of the RECs to rural Americans shows how RECs became
one of the greatest successes of the New Deal era.
29 1
C. The Benefits of Rural Electric Cooperatives for Rural America
The effects of electrification on rural life in the United States further
demonstrate the success of the RECs. Having electricity in their homes and on
their farms clearly improved the lives of rural Americans. The most obvious
benefits were directly related to electrification and included conveniences such
meet a social and economic need, despite the possibility that it may not bring the highest short-
term return for the shareholders. On the other side, Buckeye Power learned from AEP, who set the
industry standards for power generation. id at 76-77.
285. OREC, supra note 252, at 77.
286. Id. at 73.
287. Id. at 77. AEP's Service Corporation built the plant, transferring Unit 2 to Buckeye Power
after construction was complete. Id at 78. In 1977, the companies added a third unit, which
Buckeye Power fully owns. Id at 82-83.
288. Id. at 83 (quoting from an editorial in Electrical World on the groundbreaking for the
Cardinal plant in 1963).
289. NRECA, supra note 244, at 13 (providing the membership statistics for year ending 2002).
290. PURI, supra note 243, at 22-23. This change occurred in 1994, as a result of reorganization
within the Department of Agriculture. Id. Only one year earlier, Congress had passed the Rural
Electrification Loan Restructuring Act of 1993, 7 U.S.C. § 901 (2003) [hereinafter RELRA]. The
primary effect of the Act was to alter the interest rates for electrification loans. PURI, supra note
243, at 20-21.
291. PURI, supra note 243, at 3.
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as refrigeration, improved lighting and ventilation, and new farm technology.
292
With such advancements, farm life became less hazardous. New technology
resulted in fewer farming accidents. 293 Homes were also safer as a result of
improved lighting and the elimination of such dangers as kerosene lanterns.
294
Rural Americans also enjoyed less obvious benefits. One significant effect
was that the process of electrification created more jobs.295 Initially, these jobs
were directly related to the electrification process, such as those of installing and
maintaining the cooperative electrical lines.296 Later, jobs increased in other
industries to meet increased demand of certain products, such as household
electrical appliances. Perhaps the greatest benefit was an overall improvement in
the quality of rural life. Electricity allowed more work to be done with less
human labor. The need for less labor allowed the farmers and their families to
participate in leisure activities they were previously unable to enjoy, including
community activities and education.
297
Beyond these benefits of electrification, RECs have enhanced their
communities in many other ways. For instance, they contribute to the economic
stability of their communities through programs such as Operation Round Up®,
which is a charitable trust fund.298 Through this program, members may choose
to have their monthly bills "rounded up" to the next whole dollar. The proceeds
are then distributed to local charitable organizations and individuals in the
community with special needs.
The RECs also benefit rural Americans by bringing them into the larger
political community. To this end, RECs established the National Rural Electric
Cooperative Association (NRECA) to serve as a type of grassroots organizer and
lobbyist.299 The organization monitors Washington politics and notifies REC
representatives when issues arise that are relevant to the concerns of their
members. The representatives then act to inform the members and call upon
them to get involved by contacting their Senators or Congressional
292. OREC, supra note 252, at 5-6, 34-35.
293. Id. at 6.
294. Id. at 35.
295. Id. at 17, 34.
296. Id. at 39.
297. Id. at 29, 34-35 (pointing out that after electrification, children were able to finish school
because less labor was required on the farms).
298. Firelands Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., Member Handbook 9 (1995) [hereinafter FREC,
Member Handbook] (unpublished customer manual, on file with author).
299. OREC, supra note 252, at 51. The cooperatives established the NRECA in 1942. Id.
Today, the "NRECA provides effective legislative, regulatory, education, training, consulting,
marketing/communications and employee benefits programs." NRECA, supra note 244, at 16;
PURI, supra note 243, at 24.
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Representatives. 300  Through these and other programs, the RECs have
developed into an invaluable part of rural life in the United States.
V. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER THEIR NATURAL
RESOURCES: APPLYING THE MODEL OF RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
The benefits of RECs need not be limited to the rural United States. In fact,
the United Nations recognizes the cooperative structure as a major factor needed
to "promote the fullest possible participation in the economic and social
development of all people."30 1 The remainder of this article suggests that RECs
can serve as a model for protecting indigenous peoples' permanent sovereignty.
Like indigenous peoples, rural America in 1935 faced a government and a
utility industry that had little interest in considering its needs. Though they
encountered this indifference in the context of electrification, rural Americans
shared with indigenous peoples a government alienation and denial of benefits
extended to the rest of society. In this context, the problems of rural Americans
serve as a valuable tool for the Ogoni, Nisga'a, Gitxsan, Wet'suwet'en, and other
indigenous peoples:
If the Western historical experience is to be of any guide at all, the issues have
to be traced further back to the plight and predicaments of those common lots
in the rural sectors who were forced to be dislocated and alienated in the
process of technological advancement and industrialization.
302
Indigenous peoples need a system for ensuring their core right -
participation through which they may extend or withhold their consent to
exploitation of natural resources. RECs provide a model for such participation.
This section considers how the model of RECs extends to indigenous peoples'
permanent sovereignty by first attempting to show how the structure and guiding
principles of RECs can translate to a similar system for indigenous peoples. It is
important to consider obstacles to implementing the model, including the
political atmosphere that indigenous peoples face and the willingness of all
parties to participate in the model. Finally, this section will briefly discuss how
the model will realize indigenous peoples' permanent sovereignty.
300. OREC, supra note 252, at 51.
301. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/155, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 171, U.N. Doc.
A/49/49 (1994); G.A. Res. 56/114, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 3d Comm., Agenda Item 108, 2,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/114 (2002).
302. Ann Blyberg, Cultural Rights, in CIRCLE OF RIGHTS: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL & CULTURAL
RIGHTS ACTIVISM: A TRAINING MANUAL 329, 344-45 (2000).
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A. Adaptation of the Cooperative Model
Utilizing the RECs as a model for the indigenous right to permanent
sovereignty will require adaptation of the cooperative model to the specific
needs and interests of indigenous peoples. This process, which would result in
what might be called "Indigenous Cooperatives," would be no different than the
adjustments of the cooperative model to serve such varied endeavors as
agricultural production, tourism, housing, and utilities.30 3 However, some of the
unique circumstances faced by indigenous peoples may require atypical
alteration of the structure.
1. The Cooperative Structure
Previous efforts to apply the REC model to Native American utilities show
the difficulty in developing Indigenous Cooperatives. Those attempts have
failed largely because the structure was not properly adapted for the unique
interests of indigenous peoples. 304 This failure is important because it shows
that the REC structure cannot be exactly translated, but must be altered to meet
those special interests. More specifically, the failure shows that Indigenous
Cooperatives must both limit membership to tribal members and preserve the
rule of one vote per member.
30 5
At least three additional factors may dictate the need for a different
structure for Indigenous Cooperatives. First, indigenous peoples already own
their land and natural resources - by right, even if not in fact. Therefore, the
cooperatives will not require any capital investment from their members, as the
RECs required. Second, indigenous peoples may choose to exploit their natural
resources to enrich their tribes, especially considering the long-term economic
oppression they have faced. As such, Indigenous Cooperatives may be profit-
based, as opposed to the nonprofit RECs. Finally, Indigenous Cooperatives will
be unique in that the interest represented is a collective one; although individual
tribal members will participate in decision-making, the interest in the land and
natural resources is ultimately a collective one held for current and future tribal
members.
Keeping these distinctive features of indigenous peoples in mind, the
structural features and guiding principles of RECs can still serve as a model for
establishing Indigenous Cooperatives. Considering the above factors, these
cooperatives might generally have the following structural features:
303. Five Good Reasons for Co-operatives, INT'L CO-OPERATIVE INFO. CENTRE, Sept. 13, 1995, at
http:/Iwww.wisc.eduluwcclicicldef-histldeflfive.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Good
Reasons].
304. LeBeau, supra note 143, at 240.
305. Id. (noting that, where these principles are not protected, non-indigenous peoples are often
able to gain membership and destabilize the cooperative in such a way that it no longer represents
the indigenous interests).
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(1) they are private business organizations;
(2) incorporated under domestic law;
(3) for the purpose of representing the tribe;
(4) regarding its collective interest in the land and natural resources; and
(5) through an elected governing board.306
In addition to these adjustments, each Indigenous Cooperative would have to
further tailor its features to account for the special interests and circumstances of
the tribe involved.
2. The Cooperative Principles
Indigenous Cooperatives might also need to adjust the cooperative
principles that the RECs follow. Although they would be similar, Indigenous
Cooperatives might need to alter those guiding principles as follows: (1) closed
membership that is limited to, and automatic for, each member of the tribe; (2)
democratic representation through elections pursuant to the one member, one
vote principle; (3) autonomy, both from other tribal governing bodies and from
the state; (4) training and education for the representatives and cooperative
members, as relevant to protecting their permanent sovereignty; (5) cooperation
with NGOs and other indigenous peoples, with the aim of increasing their
bargaining power and developing a network of support; and (6) emphasis on
tribal values in making decisions on proposed projects of exploitation, which
will include a balance of cultural integrity with the needs of economic
development.
B. Potential Difficulties in Implementing the Cooperative Model
Even with specific changes to the REC model, the fact remains that certain
circumstances may not permit implementation of the cooperative model for
protection of the right of indigenous peoples to permanent sovereignty. At least
two possible circumstances could threaten the implementation of this model.
The first involves a political environment that is hostile to indigenous rights,
making it impossible to integrate any program that respects those rights. The
second involves the willingness of all involved parties to commit to participate
in adopting the model.
306. The Board would have many tasks, including representing the interests of the tribe in
discussions with the government and private corporations regarding development projects.
However, its duties would also include internal decisions, such as how to distribute profits from
the exploitation of their natural resources. Several distribution options are available, such as:





Many indigenous peoples are still fighting for the most basic recognition of
their rights under domestic law. Like the Ogoni, they continue to suffer at the
hands of a government that oppresses them and refuses to even consider
indigenous concerns. In such circumstances, it will likely be impossible to
implement the REC model. Even where a small chance of implementing the
model exists, the most pressing need of those indigenous peoples is the legal
recognition of their rights. No model of implementing those rights will be
effective without government acknowledgment of such rights and commitment
to their protection. Thus, RECs present a model for including the indigenous
peoples in the decision-making process that will be best implemented where the
state already recognizes an ownership right, and the only issue remaining is how
to best realize the indigenous peoples' right to control and participate in
decision-making.
Considering this limitation, application of the REC model to develop an
Ogoni Cooperative, may not be the best option at this point in time. Even with
the government's most recent efforts to alter their policy toward respecting the
Ogoni, the political atmosphere is still such that an Indigenous Cooperative may
not be the most important or effective tool for realizing the most pressing of the
Ogoni needs.
At the other end of the spectrum, the REC model is inappropriate for
application to the Nisga'a, as they have achieved actual ownership and control
over their designated land and natural resources. In contrast to the Ogoni, the
situation of the Nisga'a renders the model inapplicable because it is no longer
necessary. These indigenous peoples had the success of fully realizing their
right to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.
Where the model may work best is with indigenous peoples such as the
Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en. Although both are working toward a treaty that they
hope will bring them the same control as the Nisga'a enjoy, they could
implement the REC model during the negotiation period as a method of
protecting their interests. Just as the Nisga'a entered into an agreement for
interim measures, 30 7 the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en could propose the
implementation of an Indigenous Cooperative to protect their land and resources
from further detrimental government actions during the negotiations. Indigenous
peoples who enjoy similarly amicable relationships with their governments may
also benefit from the model, though those relationships need not include a
process of treaty negotiations. Rather, the important feature of the Gitxsan and
Wet'suwet'en example is the cooperation and mutual respect between the
indigenous peoples and their government.
307. 1992 Interim Measures, supra note 119.
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2. Incentives for Participation
Where the political atmosphere does not render the REC model useless,
another important consideration will be whether all of the parties involved are
willing to participate in a proposed Indigenous Cooperative. RECs provide a
model with benefits for all of the parties interested in exploiting the natural
resources. This includes the indigenous peoples, as well as their governments
and the private companies who are contracted to perform the work of exploiting
the resources.
Although special incentives will appeal to each category of participants,
some benefits of the cooperative model should appeal equally to all. For
example, as community enterprises, the cooperatives contribute to the economic
development of the community. When applied to indigenous peoples and their
natural resources, the community will include not only the indigenous
community, but also the larger state.308  Another important benefit is that,
through participation in the cooperative structure, the people involved learn
democratic principles that can open a market economy and translate into the
political development of the country. Finally, cooperatives contribute to a goal
that should be a concern of all humankind: raising human dignity.
30 9
a. The Indigenous Peoples
In addition to these common benefits, Indigenous Cooperatives also present
valuable incentives for each of the parties involved. Identifying the indigenous
incentives for implementing such a model may be the most fundamental.
Initially, the indigenous rights at issue appear distinct from those of the rural
United States in the 1930s. Whereas the rural farmers and other residents sought
the provision of the basic service of electricity, indigenous peoples are not
asking that anything be provided to them. Rather, they are searching for
recognition of their land and resource ownership and for involvement in
decisions that affect that interest.
This distinction does not diminish the applicability of RECs as a model for
indigenous permanent sovereignty. Instead, it requires consideration of the REC
model as a multistage development of liberation and empowerment of rural
America. Although this development began with obtaining the basic service of
electrification, it grew into much more, until the RECs were no longer requesting
electricity, but were generating and supplying it to others. 3 1 At that point intheir development, RECs were interested not in obtaining a new service, but
308. Good Reasons, supra note 303.
309. Id.
310. This is part of the Cardinal Concept: the increased power and position of RECs within the
electric industry. See supra notes 266-88 and accompanying text. Another aspect is that the RECs
began to gain greater political power. See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
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rather in retaining their position in the utility industry and ensuring that their
members received the full benefits available to customers of IOUs.
The transition of the RECs during the 1960s into a full participant in the
utility industry, as culminated in the Cardinal Concept, provides the incentive for
indigenous peoples to adopt this model: as shown by the Cardinal Concept,
indigenous peoples can use the cooperative model to place themselves firmly in
the decision-making process. Participation is fundamental to indigenous peoples
because their land is so crucial to their identity, and only the indigenous peoples,
themselves, can properly assess how certain development programs will affect
those unique interests. Thus, only through their direct and powerful participation
can decisions regarding exploitation of natural resources properly weigh their
interests and prevent a bias and discriminatory outcome. Just as the RECs were
able to turn their initial efforts toward electrification into a process for gaining
greater industry and political power, indigenous peoples can use this as a




Governments, like Nigeria, have the same incentive for carrying out an
Indigenous Cooperative as did President Roosevelt for creating the RECs:
recognition of the need to protect all sectors of the state's population, especially
those that have been previously ignored. Failure to adhere to this standard could
subject states to actions from the international community. In fact, Nigeria is
facing a 2002 decision in which the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights found Nigeria in violation of the Ogoni right to control their
land and natural resources. 3 1  Other states may face similar pressure, not only
on grounds of international law, but also through assertion of domestic laws that
protect indigenous rights. These states acknowledge that their indigenous
peoples have rights to ownership over their land and natural resources, but face
the problem of how to involve their indigenous peoples in the decisions that
affect that ownership right. For example, pursuant to Delgamuukw and the right
of Aboriginal title, Canada must respect the rights of its indigenous peoples to
control their land and natural resources. The RECs can serve as a model for all
states to extend that protection, just as they helped to electrify rural America and
to include rural residents as powerful participants in the utility industry.
311. Blyberg, supra note 302, at 344-45.
312. The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social
Rights v. Nigeria, No. 155/96, ACHPR'COMM 11, T 55 (2002) (Comm'n report) (finding Nigeria
in violation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 21(1), June 26, 1981, 21
I.L.M. 59 (1982)).
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In fact, implementing RECs as a model for permanent sovereignty may be
an inexpensive route for states to take. In implementing Indigenous
Cooperatives, governments need not provide the capital involved in electrifying
rural America because the indigenous peoples already possess such capital in the
form of their land and natural resources. Although some capital loans or
investments may initially be required for establishing the cooperative structure,
the state's primary role would be limited to involving established cooperatives as
equal partners in decisions on the development of land and natural resources.
Thus, states have an incentive to promote this model because it provides such an
inexpensive means for adhering to their domestic and international human rights
obligations.
c. Private Corporations
Thus far, this article has only briefly mentioned the role of the third party
who is primarily involved in the exploitation of natural resources: private
corporations contracted by states to exploit natural resources, such as Shell's
extraction of oil in Ogoniland. Ultimately, the obligation to respect indigenous
peoples' permanent sovereignty lies with the state whose obligation requires the
state also protect indigenous rights from outside interference. 313 Despite this,
corporations often play a vital role in the decision-making processes surrounding
government efforts in this realm. As such, use of the REC model requires
consideration of corporate interests as the third primary actor involved in
decisions regarding development of land and natural resources.
At first glance, the fact that many corporations are motivated solely by
profit may make it appear as though they have no incentive for supporting and
participating in a cooperative system for indigenous peoples. However, that
conclusion fails to consider the fact that corporate actions violating international
human rights standards can negatively affect the corporation.3 14 For example,
companies suffer as a result of a poor public image, which may lead to responses
such as consumer boycotts and social unrest that may place the company's
investments at risk.3 15 Shell's presence in Ogoniland clearly shows the reality of
these effects: after increasing battles between the MOSOP resistance and the
government's security forces, Shell faced not only damage to its physical
investments in Nigeria, but also to its reputation among its consumers in Western
313. See, e.g., Draft Declaration, supra note 174, art. 28 (recognizing the right of indigenous
peoples "to effective measures by States to prevent any interference with, alienation of or
encoachment [sic] upon these fights").
314. See, e.g., Peter F. Drucker, The New Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, 26 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 53 (1984); see also Gerald P. Neugebauer, Indigenous Peoples as Stakeholders:
Influencing Resource-Management Decisions Affecting Indigenous Community Interests in Latin
America, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1227 (2003).




countries. These negative impacts show that, contrary to what many believe,
corporate profits and promotion of human rights are not mutually exclusive.
317
Rather, corporations will likely achieve higher levels of long-term profitability
by adhering to international human rights standards.318 As one author stated,
corporations must "do good in order to do well." 319 As such, corporations have
a clear incentive for promoting programs that respect human rights.
In addition to this incentive, the REC model also gives corporations a short-
term incentive. This is proved by the Cardinal Concept: when it partnered with
Ohio's RECs, the private utility AEP entered a highly profitable relationship.
320
This phase of REC development shows that private companies that are solely
profit-motivated can enter relationships with cooperative entities without
negatively affecting their bottom line. In fact, the unique opportunities presented
by such partnerships may be extremely profitable. Due to this development,
corporations can support application of the REC model to indigenous peoples'
permanent sovereignty because such a partnership will be profitable both in the
short-term and the long-term.
The investment required for corporations to enjoy such profits is relatively
small: they need only to commit to involving established Indigenous
Cooperatives in the decision-making process for projects involving exploitation.
Corporations must invite the cooperatives to the bargaining table, while also
abandoning their preconceived notions so that all parties can determine how best
to meet their collective interests. 321 Initially, this may require corporations to
take more initiative in developing exploitation programs that fully consider
indigenous concerns. However, by developing programs that are mutually
beneficial, corporations will soon begin to realize short-term profits that, in the
long-term, will surely cover any initial cost for engaging in this process.
C. Success in Realizing the Right of Indigenous Peoples' Permanent
Sovereignty
Through the application of this REC structure, indigenous peoples may be
able to overcome their current "lack of consultation about, or participation in, the
design of development projects of which they are the supposed beneficiaries."
322
The REC system was successful for the rural United States because it worked
from the foundational principle "that the best way to ... [electrify rural
316. Lewis, supra note 41.
317. Drucker, supra note 314, at 59-62; see also Neugebauer, supra note 314, at 1231.
318. Drucker, supra note 314, at 59-62; see also Neugebauer, supra note 315, at 1231, 1242-46.
319. Drucker, supra note 314, at 59.
320. See supra notes 268-88 and accompanying text.
321. PURl, supra note 243, at 54.
322. PYAGBARA, supra note 41.
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America] was to work with the rural Americans themselves." '323 The same
system can serve as a model to empower indigenous peoples such as the Ogoni
and the many First Nations of Canada. By giving indigenous peoples the
opportunity to participate in exploitation of natural resources, they can become
valuable players in such efforts.
Indigenous Cooperatives can go even further by ensuring that indigenous
peoples reap the economic benefits of the exploitation of their natural resources.
The reality is that indigenous peoples, besides being excluded from decision-
making, also bear a significant and disproportionate amount of the harm
resulting from such projects. As with the Ogoni, the state and extracting
corporation often fail to share the wealth resulting from extraction. The
indigenous peoples are the ones who need it the most, for they face the resulting
degradation of their lands and other natural resources, which are adjacent to the
extractive projects.
The model of RECs provides a solution by involving indigenous peoples
during the early stages of the decision-making process, thereby allowing their
input to affect the development project in a way that prevents the most harmful
results of such projects. Moreover, by ensuring that indigenous peoples receive
their share of the profits from the development programs, Indigenous
Cooperatives will provide the indigenous peoples with the resources necessary to
deal with any negative effects that could not be prevented. In this way, the
cooperative model that brought benefits other than electrification to the rural
United States324 could reap numerous rewards for indigenous peoples.
VI. CONCLUSION
International law is increasingly recognizing the right of indigenous peoples
to permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. However, indigenous
peoples often suffer from state practices that continue to ignore their interests.
RECs present a model for implementing the right of indigenous peoples'
permanent sovereignty. Applying this model will empower indigenous peoples
to enter a relationship with states and private corporations, which will lead to
true benefits for all involved.
323. PURl, supra note 243, at 3.
324. Supra notes 292-300 and accompanying text.
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